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THE HIGH COST OF EDUCATION FEDERALISM 
Kimberly Jenkins Robinson • 
Education federalism in the United States traditionally 
embraces state and local authority over education and a restricted 
federal role.l Even as the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 
("NCLB")2 expanded and transformed the federal role in education, 
the tradition of state and local control over education influenced key 
provisions within the statute.3 Some praise the nation's long-
standing approach to education federalism-which this Article 
defines as an emphasis on state and local control over education and 
a limited federal role-for its ability to foster local control of 
education, encourage experimentation, and promote a robust 
competition for excellence in education. 4 This approach to education 
* Professor, University of Richmond School of Law. I am thankful for the 
insightful comments of Jim Gibson, William Koski, Corinna Lain, Martha 
Minow, Wendy Perdue, James Ryan, and Kevin Walsh. I am grateful for the 
research assistance of Erin Weaver, Danielle Wingfield, and Melissa Wright. 
1 Carl F. Kaestle, Federal Education Policy and the Changing National 
Polity for Education, 1957-2007, in To EDUCATE A NATION: FEDERAL AND 
NATIONAL STRATEGIES OF SCHOOL REFORM 17 (Carl F. Kaestle & Alyssa E. 
Lodewick eds., 2007). 
2. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). 
3. See generally PAUL MANNA, COLLISION COURSE: FEDERAL EDUCATION 
POLICY MEETS STATE AND LOCAL REALITIES (2011) [hereinafter MANNA, 
COLLISION COURSE]; PAUL MANNA, SCHOOL'S IN: FEDERALISM AND THE NATIONAL 
EDUCATION AGENDA (2006) [hereinafter MANNA, SCHOOL'S IN]; PATRICK J. 
MCGUINN, No CHILD LEFT BEHIND AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF FEDERAL 
EDUCATION POLICY, 1965-2005 (2006). 
4. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 49-50 
(1973) ("[L]ocal control means ... the freedom to devote more money to the 
education of one's children. Equally important, however, is the opportunity it 
offers for participation in the decisionmaking [sic] process that determines how 
those local tax dollars will be spent. . . . Pluralism also affords some 
opportunity for experimentation, innovation, and a healthy competition for 
educational excellence." (citation omitted)); Wendy Parker, Connecting the Dots: 
Grutter, School Desegregation, and Federalism, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1691, 
1755 (2004) ('When the choice is between federal court oversight and local or 
state authority over public schools, then the latter is clearly more consistent 
with promoting public participation in democracy, preventing tyranny, and 
encouraging experimentation."); Michael Rebell, Fiscal Equity in Education: 
Deconstructing the Reigning Myths and Facing Reality, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
Soc. CHANGE 691, 708 (1995) ("[L]ocal control of education remains a worthy 
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federalism also is praised for how it enables local communities to 
respond to local needs and promotes accountability.5 The current 
structure of education federalism resembles the relationship 
between the national and state governments, and like that 
relationship, it seeks to capitalize on an array of viewpoints and 
methods regarding the most effective approaches to education. 6 
Although the nation's current approach to education federalism 
undoubtedly generates some benefits, it also tolerates substantial 
inequitable disparities in educational opportunity both within and 
between states. 7 The reality of local control of education for many 
communities means the ability to control inadequate resources that 
provide many students substandard educational opportunities. s The 
ideal. Local control encourages diversity, innovation, and experimentation in 
education."). 
5. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 50-51 (noting that through local control of 
education, "[e]ach locality is free to tailor local programs to local needs"); 
Richard Briffault, The Role of Local Control in School Finance Reform, 24 
CONN. L. REV. 773, 774, 809 (1992) (noting that some of the benefits of local 
control are the ability of communities to respond effectively to local needs and 
to increase accountability); Parker, supra note 4 (arguing that state and local 
control of education promotes the participation of citizens in democratic 
government); Rebell, supra note 4 ("Moreover, it [local control] promotes 
efficiency and direct accountability to those most affected by schooling 
practices-the parents and citizens who live in that particular community. 
Perhaps most significantly, local control invites a high level of direct citizen 
involvement at the grass-roots level. Despite its many shortcomings, the local 
school district remains the most broad-based and effective vehicle for 
meaningful participatory democracy in American society."). 
6. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 50; Parker, supra note 4, at 1749-50 ("As 
smaller entities of government, states and localities can experiment with 
different approaches to maximize the opportunities for success. Lastly, and 
closely related to the value of promoting states as laboratories for 
experimentation, is the value of creating communities of shared interests. 
Allowing experimentation at the state and local level will also allow cultural 
and local diversity that can benefit any number of viewpoints."). 
7. See MICHAEL A. REBELL & JESSICA R. WOLFF, MOVING EVERY CHILD 
AHEAD: FROM NCLB HYPE TO MEANINGFUL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 39 (2008) 
("[P]oor and minority students, whose readiness for learning is severely affected 
by conditions of poverty, are nevertheless more likely than their more affluent 
White peers to attend lower-quality schools-however school quality is 
measured-and to lack adequate educational resources to meet their learning 
needs."); JAMES E. RYAN, FivE MILES AWAY, A WORLD APART: ONE CITY, Two 
SCHOOLS, AND THE STORY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY IN MODERN AMERICA 
178--79 (2010); Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and National Citizenship, 
116 YALE L.J. 330, 332 (2006). 
8. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 64-65 (White, J., dissenting) ("The difficulty 
with the Texas system, however, is that it provides a meaningful option to 
Alamo Heights and like school districts but almost none to Edgewood and those 
other districts with a low per-pupil real estate tax base. In these latter 
districts, no matter how desirous parents are of supporting their schools with 
greater revenues, it is impossible to do so through the use of the real estate 
property tax. In these districts, the Texas system utterly fails to extend a 
realistic choice to parents because the property tax, which is the only revenue-
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opportunity divide in American education continues to relegate far 
too many poor and minority schoolchildren to substandard 
educational opportunities.9 These communities are left behind in 
the competition for educational excellence.lO In addition, high-
poverty schools, particularly those within urban school districts, 
regularly yield the worst academic outcomes.H 
ra1smg mechanism extended to school districts, is practically and legally 
unavailable."); REBELL & WOLFF, supra note 7, at 163 (''Most of the schools that 
serve low-income and minority students do not have the material or human 
resources to provide a meaningful educational opportunity to their students, 
and many schools do not have the capacity to implement school improvement or 
corrective action plans, no matter how well conceived."); Thomas Kleven, 
Federalizing Public Education, 55 VILL. L. REV. 369, 393 (2010) ("State and local 
financing produces substantial inequalities in per pupil educational 
expenditures. Because local governments' tax bases differ widely within states, 
so does their ability to raise money to fund education. As a result, the richer 
school districts in which well-off children tend to live generally spend more 
money on education and provide a higher quality education than the poorer 
districts where the less well-off live."). 
9. See THE EQUITY & ExcELLENCE CoMM'N, FoR EACH AND EVERY CHILD: A 
STRATEGY FOR EDUCATION EQUITY AND EXCELLENCE 14 (2013) ("Ten million 
students in America's poorest communities-and millions more Mrican 
American, Latino, Asian American, Pacific Islander, American Indian and 
Alaska Native students who are not poor-are having their lives unjustly and 
irredeemably blighted by a system that consigns them to the lowest-performing 
teachers, the most run-down facilities, and academic expectations and 
opportunities considerably lower than what we expect of other students."); 
REBELL & WOLFF, supra note 7, at 13 ("Glaring gaps in educational achievement 
and in educational opportunity persist for the children of our nation's poor, of 
our immigrants, and of our families of color."); RYAN, supra note 7, at 1. 
10. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 127-28 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("If Texas 
had a system truly dedicated to local fiscal control, one would expect the quality 
of the educational opportunity provided in each district to vary with the 
decision of the voters in that district as to the level of sacrifice they wish to 
make for public education. In fact, the Texas scheme produces precisely the 
opposite result. Local school districts cannot choose to have the best education 
in the State by imposing the highest tax rate. Instead, the quality of the 
educational opportunity offered by any particular district is largely determined 
by the amount of taxable property located in the district-a factor over which 
local voters can exercise no control."); REBELL & WOLFF, supra note 7, at 13-14 
("In large part, the persistent gap between the American ideal of equality in 
education and the reality of starkly inadequate schooling for low-income and 
minority children stems from the irony that although America's dedication to 
educational equity has surpassed that of any other nation, its commitment to 
equality in related areas of social welfare has lagged far behind that of other 
industrialized countries .... "); Derek Black, Unlocking the Power of State 
Constitutions with Equal Protection: The First Step Toward Education as a 
Federally Protected Right, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1343, 1354 (2010) ("[S]tates 
consistently spend less on the education of students who attend predominantly 
poor and/or minority school districts. Based on the state and national averages, 
we spend $908 less per pupil on students in minority schools than we do on 
students in predominantly white schools."). 
11. RYAN, supra note 7, at 277. 
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These disparities in educational opportunity hinder schools 
from fulfilling some of their essential national and institutional 
goals. Schools serve indispensable public functions within a 
democratic society: they prepare students to engage in the nation's 
political system in an intelligent and effective manner and transmit 
the fundamental societal values that a democratic government 
requires. 12 The nation also relies on its public schools as the 
principal institutional guarantor of equal opportunity within 
American society by serving as a mechanism to ensure that children 
are not hindered in attaining their dreams by their life 
circumstances,13 Americans depend on schools to address the 
societal challenges created by social and economic inequality rather 
than creating the extensive social welfare networks that many 
industrialized countries have implemented.l4 The disparities in 
educational opportunity that relegate many poor and minority 
students to substandard schooling have hindered the ability of 
schools to serve these functions. Indeed, rather than solve these 
challenges, low graduation rates and substandard schools cost the 
United States billions of dollars each year in lost tax and income 
revenues, higher health care costs, food stamps, and welfare and 
housing assistance, to name a few of the costs.l5 
This Article will show the consistent ways that the current 
understanding of education federalism within the United States has 
hindered three of the major reform efforts to promote a more 
equitable distribution of educational opportunity: school 
desegregation, school finance litigation, and, most recently, NCLB. 
In exploring how education federalism has undermined these 
efforts, this Article adds to the understanding of other scholars who 
have critiqued these reformsl6 and examined why the nation has 
12. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982); Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 
347 u.s. 483, 493 (1954). 
13. Greg J. Duncan & Richard J. Murnane, Introduction: The American 
Dream, Then and Now, in WHITHER OPPORTUNITY?: RISING INEQUALITY, 
SCHOOLS, AND CHILDREN'S LIFE CHANCES 3, 7 (Greg J. Duncan & Richard J. 
Murnane eds., 2011). 
14. REBELL & WOLFF, supra note 7, at 26. 
15. See Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Past, Present, and Future of Equal 
Educational Opportunity: A Call for a New Theory of Education Federalism, 79 
U. CHI. L. REV. 427, 429 (2012) (reviewing RYAN, supra note 7) (summarizing 
research on the costs of substandard education). 
16. For critiques of school desegregation, see, for example, Goodwin Liu, 
Brown, Bollinger, and Beyond, 47 How. L.J. 705, 718-36 (2004) (critiquing the 
Court's desegregation decisions for their impatience in achieving results and 
their indifference to persistent inequality); Wendy Parker, The Future of School 
Desegregation, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1157, 1162-78 (2000) (noting that several of 
the Court's desegregation decisions significantly lessened the burden of proving 
the absence of vestiges of discrimination but that these decisions still could be 
interpreted to require a demanding judicial inquiry of school desegregation); 
Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, Resurrecting the Promise of Brown: Understanding 
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failed to guarantee equal educational opportunity. 17 For example, 
scholars have argued that the failure to undertake earnest efforts to 
achieve equal educational opportunity is caused by a variety of 
factors, including the lack of political will to accomplish this goal, 
and Remedying How the Supreme Court Reconstitutionalized Segregated 
Schools, 88 N.C. L. REV. 787, 811-37 (2010) (analyzing how some of the Court's 
leading desegregation decisions sanctioned a return to segregated schools). For 
critiques of Rodriguez and school finance litigation, see, for example, ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, THE CONSERVATIVE AsSAULT ON THE CONSTITUTION 35-36 (2010) 
("The Court held that there is no constitutional right to education and thus that 
differentials in spending between wealthy and poor school districts within a 
metropolitan area are constitutionally permissible. If I were to list the most 
important, and the worst, Supreme Court decisions during my lifetime, 
Rodriguez would be high on this list."); John Dinan, School Finance Litigation: 
The Third Wave Recedes, in FROM SCHOOLHOUSE TO COURTHOUSE: THE 
JUDICIARY'S ROLE IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 96, 96 (Joshua M. Dunn & Martin R. 
West eds., 2009) [hereinafter FROM SCHOOLHOUSE TO COURTHOUSE] (addressing 
how school finance litigation experienced sustained success for almost two 
decades but now shows signs offaltering); Danielle Holley-Walker, A New Era 
for Desegregation, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 423, 456-57 (2012) (noting the tendency 
of school finance cases to ensure only a minimally adequate education); 
Christopher Roellke et al., School Finance Litigation: The Promises and 
Limitations of the Third Wave, 79 PEABODY J. Enuc. 104, 105 (2004) ("Despite 
intensified school finance litigation and legislation over the past several 
decades, school systems in the United States continue their struggle to operate 
equitably and adequately. The evidence is clear that these goals of equity and 
adequacy have been particularly elusive for schools attended primarily by low-
income and minority children."). For critiques of NCLB, see, for example, 
Regina Ramsey James, How to Mend a Broken Act: Recapturing Those Left 
Behind by No Child Left Behind, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 683, 691 (2010) (''This Act 
was passed in a well-intentioned, albeit misguided, effort to curtail educational 
inequality. However, the NCLB Act, with all its focus on high-stakes tests as 
indicators of academic success, exacerbates the problem by unduly causing 
administrators, principals, teachers and most importantly students to stress 
practicing skills and drills of abstract, often irrelevant-particularly from the 
students' vantage point-facts likely to be tested, replacing in depth learning 
with rote memorization."); James E. Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of the No 
Child Left Behind Act, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932, 934 (2004) (contending that 
NCLB creates incentives for states to lower academic standards, increase school 
segregation, push out low-performing students, and discourage good teachers 
from taking the more challenging jobs). 
17. See, e.g., REBELL & WOLFF, supra note 7, at 13-14 (noting that low-
income and minority communities are not provided equal or adequate 
educational opportunity and that these communities also have not been able to 
overcome such obstacles as poor health, inadequate nutrition and housing, 
racism, and an unstable economy); RYAN, supra note 7, at 1 (arguing that 
education policy has failed to ensure equal educational opportunity because it 
has consistently sought to spare suburban schools from efforts to improve urban 
schools); Black, supra note 10 (arguing that states provide inferior educational 
funding to predominantly poor and minority school districts); Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Lost Opportunity: The Burger Court and the Failure to Achieve 
Equal Educational Opportunity, 45 MERCER L. REV. 999, 1012 (1994) (arguing 
that Nixon appointees to the Supreme Court voted to uphold court decisions 
that blocked legal avenues to achieve equal educational opportunity). 
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the domination of suburban influences over education politics, and 
the failure of the United States to create a social welfare system 
that addresses the social and economic barriers that impede the 
achievement of many poor and minority students. 1s In a past work, 
I also explored some of the reasons that these efforts have failed to 
ensure equal educational opportunity,19 In light of this literature, 
education federalism undoubtedly is not the only factor that has 
influenced the nation's inability to ensure equal educational 
opportunity. Nevertheless, it is important to understand the 
consistent ways in which education federalism has contributed to 
the ineffectiveness of efforts to ensure equal educational opportunity 
as scholars propose new avenues to achieve this paramount goal. In 
addition, in both past and future work, I argue that the nation 
should consider embracing a new framework for education 
federalism that would enable the nation to more effectively achieve 
its goals for public schools.2o Understanding how education 
federalism has hindered past reforms is an essential part of 
exploring how education federalism should be reshaped. 
In addition, this Article also briefly highlights that when the 
Supreme Court and Congress limited reforms to advance equal 
educational opportunity, they harkened back to an extinct model of 
dual federalism and failed to acknowledge that, since the New Deal, 
the nation has moved to the increasing jurisdictional partnerships 
that are oftentimes labeled cooperative federalism.21 In this way, 
this Article engages some of the federalism scholarship. 
Furthermore, this Article notes that one possible explanation for 
some of the Court's decisions is that the Court may be claiming that 
federalism prevents it from acting when the Court lacks the will or 
18. See, e.g., REBELL & WOLFF, supra note 7, at 13-14 (noting that the lack 
of a comprehensive welfare system in the United States has created barriers to 
success for low-income and minority children); RYAN, supra note 7, at 272 
(''Middle-income and more affluent families, mostly white, have largely walled 
themselves off in separate school districts, leaving to others the task of 
educating low-income students, most of whom are Mrican-American or 
Hispanic. For fifty years, the law and politics of educational opportunity have 
operated to protect the schools behind those walls."); Erwin Chemerinsky, The 
Deconstitutionalization of Education, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 111, 111-12 (2004) 
(discussing the failure of public officials to address school segregation and 
school inequality due to political unpopularity of "any systematic attempt to 
deal with education"). 
19. Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Case for a Collaborative Enforcement 
Model for a Federal Right to Education, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1653, 1660-81 
(2007). 
20. See Robinson, supra note 15, at 433; Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, 
Reconstructing Education Federalism (Apr. 6, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with author). 
21. ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TuG OF WAR WITHIN, at xiv (2011); 
ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF 
FuNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 6 (2009). 
2013] HIGH COST OF EDUCATION FEDERALISM 293 
an interest in ensuring that equal educational opportunity becomes 
a reality for all schoolchildren. Although it would be impossible to 
confirm if this explanation is accurate, this Article identifies the 
evidence that suggests that this behavior by the Court may be 
occurring. After noting this possibility, this Article then takes the 
Court at its word that education federalism is driving its decisions 
while exploring the ramifications of the Court's decisions for equal 
educational opportunity. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I examines how 
education federalism functioned as one of the critical impediments 
to school desegregation. Part II analyzes how education federalism 
has handcuffed the reach of school finance litigation. Part III 
critiques how education federalism has undermined the 
effectiveness of NCLB. This analysis reveals how the interrelated 
interests in maintaining the current balance of power between the 
federal and state governments and in preserving local control of 
education have limited the effectiveness of these reforms. By 
examining how education federalism has served as one of the central 
obstructions to reforms that sought to ensure equal educational 
opportunity, this Article concludes that future efforts to advance 
equal educational opportunity must undertake an analysis of how 
education federalism can be restructured to support all children 
receiving an equal opportunity to obtain an excellent education. 
I. EDUCATION FEDERALISM AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 
School desegregation served as a vehicle for ending the second-
class citizenship of African Americans that Plessy v. Ferguson's 
separate-but-equal policy sanctioned.22 The Court's decision in 
Brown v. Board of Education (Brown [)23 struck down segregated 
schools as unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.24 
Yet, the implementation of this decision was eventually hampered 
by a variety of factors, including massive resistance.25 To 
understand how the Court privileged education federalism over the 
equal educational opportunity that school desegregation sought to 
ensure, this Part first describes the Court's eventual demanding 
interpretation of the Brown decisions that required integrated 
schools and an elimination of all traces of discrimination. 
This Part then identifies the key desegregation decisions that 
reveal two intimately interrelated education federalism interests 
that influenced the decisions that substantially limited the 
22. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550-52 (1896), overruled by 
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown[), 347 U.S. 483 (1954); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE 
JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S 
STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 709, 748 (1976). 
23. 347 u.s. 483. 
24. Id. at 488, 495. 
25. See KLUGER, supra note 22, at 751. 
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implementation of effective desegregation plans. First, the Court 
repeatedly noted the importance of local control of education and 
that it did not want desegregation to interfere with this important 
tradition of American education. Second, the Court did not want to 
disrupt the existing balance of power between the federal and state 
governments regarding education. Ultimately, the Court concluded 
in these cases that these interests outweighed the interest in 
ensuring that the plaintiffs could attend desegregated schools 
offering equal educational opportunity. Thus, they reflect the 
Court's deliberate placement of education federalism above equal 
educational opportunity on the hierarchy of interests within 
American education and society.26 The lower courts took note of the 
Court's preferences and its focus on local control and were 
encouraged to terminate desegregation orders.27 
Finally, this Part concludes by acknowledging that the Supreme 
Court's 2007 decision in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. 
Seattle School District No. J2B may plausibly be read to suggest that 
education federalism was simply used as a convenient cover for a 
Court that lacked a strong commitment to effective school 
desegregation. However, a plausible alternative reading of the 
decision acknowledges that education federalism remained 
important but was outweighed by an interest in ending the use of 
racial classifications. 
A. How Education Federalism Impeded Effective School 
Desegregation 
The Court's 1954 decision in Brown I insisted that educational 
opportunity must be provided "on equal terms" and that segregation 
of educational facilities had "no place" in American society.29 In 
reaching this decision, the Court noted the importance of education 
26. As will be discussed in Part I.B, the Court's most recent decision 
regarding school integration departed from its prior insistence on local control 
of schools. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 
U.S. 701, 732-35 (2007) (striking down two voluntary school integration efforts 
that considered the race of students because it found that the plans were not 
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest); James E. Ryan, The 
Real Lessons of School Desegregation, in FROM SCHOOLHOUSE TO COURTHOUSE, 
supra note 16, at 89 (noting that this decision represents a departure from the 
Court's prior insistence on local decision making of schools). Although the 
decision does not offer local control of schools as the reason for doing so, like the 
desegregation cases discussed in the text, the decision consistently assigns a 
low priority to integrated schools and the equal educational opportunity that 
such schools can provide. See Robinson, supra note 16, at 838-39. 
27. See Bradley W. Joondeph, Skepticism and School Desegregation, 76 
WASH. U. L.Q. 161, 166 (1998); Ronald Turner, The Voluntary School 
Integration Cases and the Contextual Equal Protection Clause, 51 How. L.J. 
251, 295--96 (2008). 
28. 551 u.s. 701 (2007). 
29. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 493-95. 
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and the harms that segregation inflicted upon Mrican American 
schoolchildren.3o In so doing, the Court opined that equal 
educational opportunity required desegregated schools. 
However, this unequivocal condemnation of segregation was 
quickly undermined in 1955 when the Court, in Brown II, explained 
that after districts had made "a prompt and reasonable start toward 
full compliance," school districts could desegregate "with all 
deliberate speed."31 The Court's decision in Brown II also invited 
delays in desegregation by placing school districts that violated the 
Constitution in charge of developing the appropriate remedy for the 
segregation and by failing to issue guidance on the scope of the 
desegregation obligation, the timing by which desegregation must be 
completed, and the appropriate remedy for noncompliant districts.32 
Despite making it clear that open defiance was unacceptable, 33 the 
Court's decisions and inactions for over a decade after Brown I 
worsened the delay sanctioned by Brown II. 34 In response to the 
Court's gradualism and limited support for desegregation from the 
executive branch, school districts adopted a variety of tactics to 
forestall school desegregation and maintain the status quo. 35 
Although the pace of desegregation slowly began to increase a 
decade after the Brown decisions, a mere one percent of Mrican 
American students were enrolled in desegregated schools in the 
South at the time.36 Some scholars contend that without its own 
enforcement authority or any congressional action, and with limited 
presidential support, the Court lacked the authority and the 
inclination to go beyond this limited change.37 
The glacial pace of desegregation and the civil rights movement 
eventually led the legislative and executive branches to demand 
effective school desegregation.as Congress passed the Civil Rights 
30. Id. at 493-94. 
31. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1955). 
32. See Robinson, supra note 16, at 798. 
33. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
34. Robinson, supra note 16, at 802. For a discussion of the ways that 
Brown II and the Court's actions and inactions slowed the process of school 
desegregation, see id. at 797-803. 
35. See id. at 800. For a discussion of the ways that school districts delayed 
and avoided school desegregation after Brown II, see id. at 802-03. 
36. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE 
SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 349 (2004); GERALD N. 
ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 52 
(2d ed. 2008). 
37. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS MOVEMENT 123 (2007); CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., ALL DELIBERATE 
SPEED: REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRST HALF CENTURY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION 124 (2004); STEPHEN L. WASBY ET AL., DESEGREGATION FROM BROWN 
TO ALEXANDER 124 (1977). 
38. See KLARMAN, supra note 37, at 101, 123-24; RYAN, supra note 7, at 59; 
Robinson, supra note 16, at 807. 
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Act of 1964 and authorized the Attorney General to initiate action 
against a school district that denied admission to a school on the 
basis of race or otherwise violated equal protection of the laws.39 
The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare ("HEW") issued 
guidance in 1965 requiring districts to take action that would create 
integrated schools, but this guidance initially emphasized whether 
school officials were acting in good faith and permitted the use of 
freedom of choice plans that were typically ineffective.4o After the 
Court's decision in Green v. County School Board of New Kent 
County,41 which is described below, HEW subsequently 
strengthened its guidance to forbid the use of freedom of choice if it 
failed to eliminate the vestiges of segregation. 42 
The Court also eventually demanded reliable and long-standing 
results from desegregation plans in the 1968 Green decision and the 
1971 decision in Swann u. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of 
Education.43 In Green, the Court finally demanded that school 
districts end the delays in desegregation and immediately 
implement an effective plan. 44 The Court clarified school districts' 
desegregation obligation by identifying six areas that must be 
desegregated: faculty, staff, the assignment of students to particular 
schools, extracurricular activities, facilities, and transportation.45 
In defining the scope of the obligation of school districts, the Court 
clarified that districts must create integrated schools that 
eliminated all of the harmful effects of segregation and forbade 
subsequent discrimination.46 Green signaled that desegregation 
plans would be measured based on their results and that integrated 
schools were the ultimate goal.47 
Swann further emphasized the importance of results by 
sanctioning the use of ratios to guide desegregation, urging the 
elimination of one-race schools whenever possible, approving of 
revising attendance zones, and upholding busing as a desegregation 
tool when busing did not impair the educational experience or 
39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(c)-6(a) (2006). The statute also forbids recipients of 
federal financial assistance from discriminating on the basis of race, color, or 
national origin. Id. § 2000(d). 
40. See Robinson, supra note 16, at 807. 
41. 391 u.s. 430 (1968). 
42. See Robinson, supra note 16, at 807. 
43. 402 u.s. 1 (1971). 
44. Green, 391 U.S. at 439. 
45. Id. at 435. 
46. Id. at 438 & n.4, 442. Given these requirements, the Court upheld the 
plaintiffs' challenge to a freedom-of-choice plan that ostensibly allowed students 
to attend a school of their choice because under the plan, eighty-five percent of 
the Mrican American students in the district were still attending all-African 
American schools. ld. at 437, 441. 
47. See Robinson, supra note 16, at 805-07. 
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health of schoolchildren.48 Both Green and Swann were crucial in 
providing much-needed guidance on the scope of the obligation to 
desegregate and the necessity of immediate implementation of 
desegregation plans that created integrated schools.49 Ultimately, 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, enforcement action by HEW, and Green 
and Swann notified school districts that they must end the delay 
and avoidance tactics of the past and resulted in numerous judicial 
desegregation decrees.50 
Yet, federal support for meaningful desegregation proved to be 
quite short lived. Less than a year after Green, the nation elected 
Richard Nixon to serve as President, and, once in office, he upheld 
his campaign promise to slow the pace of school desegregation. 51 He 
ordered both HEW and the Department of Justice to pull back on 
their desegregation efforts and to contest the position of the NAACP 
in some desegregation litigation. Nixon's election as President 
ended the very short time frame in which all three branches of 
government acted aggressively to ensure effective school 
desegregation. 52 
The Court's position also shifted shortly thereafter, and it began 
to privilege education federalism over the Court's prior goal of an 
effective desegregation plan that sought to ensure equal educational 
opportunity. In 197 4, the Court's decision in Milliken v. Bradley 
(Milliken l) erected what proved to be a virtually insurmountable 
barrier to effective desegregation in many northern districts.53 In 
Milliken I, the Court overturned a lower court desegregation plan 
for the Detroit public school system that included an interdistrict 
remedy.54 The lower courts found that the federal government, the 
school district, and the state of Michigan had intentionally created 
segregated schools; the courts responded by implementing a 
remedial interdistrict plan because an intradistrict plan would be 
ineffective and would effectively annul the decision in Brown. 55 The 
Supreme Court rejected the plan and held that an interdistrict 
remedy could only be implemented if the neighboring districts or the 
state had committed acts that intentionally segregated students 
48. Swann, 402 U.S. at 16, 25-31. 
49. For a full discussion of the importance of Green and Swann, see 
Robinson, supra note 16, at 805-09. 
50. See KLARMAN, supra note 37, at 123-24; Robinson, supra note 16, at 
810-11. 
51. See RYAN, supra note 7, at 59-60. 
52. Id. at 59. 
53. See generally Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I), 418 U.S. 717 (197 4). For 
an extensive discussion of the barriers that Milliken I created for integration, 
see RYAN, supra note 7, at 105-08; Robinson, supra note 16, at 813-19. 
54. Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 746-48. 
55. See id. at 724-25; Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 249 (6th Cir. 1973) 
(en bane), rev'd, 418 U.S. 717. 
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across districts and thereby committed an interdistrict 
constitutional violation. 56 
The Court's rejection of an effective desegregation plan 
emphasized two closely interrelated concerns that implicate 
education federalism. First, the Court heralded the importance of 
local control of education.s7 The Court rejected the district court's 
willingness to treat district lines as creatures of administrative ease 
because the lower court's approach was "contrary to the history of 
public education in our country."ss Indeed, in the Court's view, "[n]o 
single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local 
control over the operation of schools; local autonomy has long been 
thought essential both to the maintenance of community concern 
and support for public schools and to [the] quality of the educational 
process."59 The Court characterized the education system in 
Michigan as one that provided extensive local control in a fashion 
similar to other statesGo_a characterization that Justice Marshall 
in dissent vociferously challenged61-and noted that the proposed 
remedy would disrupt the organization of school districts by 
consolidating fifty-four districts into one large school district.62 
Second, the Court's opinion also reflected its concerns about 
substantially altering the balance of power between the federal and 
state governments as it relates to education. In raising numerous 
concerns about how the proposed new school district would be 
governed, the Court stated that it was "obvious from the scope of the 
interdistrict remedy itself that absent a complete restructuring of 
the laws of Michigan relating to school districts the District Court 
will become first, a de facto 'legislative authority' to resolve these 
complex questions, and then the 'school superintendent' for the 
entire area."63 Such an arrangement would dramatically shift the 
balance of power between the federal government and state and 
local governments-a change that the Court undoubtedly viewed as 
undesirable. 
Milliken I serves as one of the primary examples of how the 
Court privileged the current understanding of education federalism 
over the equal educational opportunity that Brown I sought to 
guarantee. Numerous scholars have noted the near-fatal impact of 
56. Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 744-47. 
57. See id. at 741. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. at 741-42. 
60. See id. at 742-43. The Court reached this conclusion "despite the fact 
that school districts in Michigan were creatures of the state, not the local, 
government .... " RYAN, supra note 7, at 101-02. 
61. See Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 793-97 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
62. Id. at 742-43 (majority opinion). 
63. Id. at 743-44. 
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Milliken I on desegregation.64 The decision removed the possibility 
of developing effective remedies in many districts throughout the 
North and West because the districts educated an insufficient 
number of white students to create integrated schools. 65 Only a 
small handful of districts could prove an interdistrict violation. 66 
Despite the fact that the Court had held in Green that districts had 
a constitutional obligation to remedy segregation by creating 
integrated schools,67 the schoolchildren in the overwhelming 
majority of districts in the North and West did not receive an 
integrated education. 68 
Several additional Supreme Court desegregation decisions also 
continued to exalt the Court's understanding of education 
64. See, e.g., RYAN, supra note 7, at 105 ("It is difficult to exaggerate the 
consequences of Milliken, which is easily the most important desegregation 
decision aside from Brown. . . . On the whole, ... suburban school districts 
received a pass from busing plans. Without the participation of the suburbs, 
busing was bound to be a failure." (footnotes omitted)); Joondeph, supra note 27, 
at 164; Robinson, supra note 16, at 814 ("Milliken I erected an almost uniformly 
insurmountable barrier to interdistrict remedies .... "); Id. at 818-19 nn.209-
10 (citing scholars who argue that Milliken I was one of the primary causes of 
desegregation's failure). 
65. Molly S. McUsic, The Law's Role in the Distribution of Education: The 
Promises and Pitfalls of School Finance Litigation, in LAw AND ScHOOL REFORM: 
SIX STRATEGIES FOR PROMOTING EDUCATIONAL EQmTY 88, 102 (Jay P. Heubert 
ed., 1999). 
66. See RYAN, supra note 7, at 105 (noting that only four metropolitan 
areas-Little Rock, Indianapolis, Wilmington, and Louisville-ordered 
interdistrict busing, St. Louis adopted interdistrict busing in a desegregation 
settlement, and a few additional districts adopted busing because the city and 
suburbs were located in the same school district). 
67. See Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of New Kent Cnty., 391 U.S. 430,438 & n.4, 
442 (1968). 
68. See Chemerinsky, supra note 18, at 118; Robinson, supra note 16, at 
816. In this way, the Court's protection of local control in Milliken I preserved 
the autonomy of predominantly white suburban neighborhoods and the 
preferences of middle-income whites. RYAN, supra note 7, at 103-04; see also 
Liu, supra note 16, at 726. Furthermore, the negative impact of Milliken rs 
preference for local control over integrated schools was not mitigated by 
Milliken Irs approval of an alternative desegregation plan that included 
compensatory programs such as a remedial reading program and professional 
development for teachers and administrators. See Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken 
II), 433 U.S. 267, 272-77, 287-88 (1977). Numerous school districts sought 
Milliken II funding as an alternative to busing, because busing was futile due to 
the high concentrations of minority students within a district. See Ryan, supra 
note 26, at 73, 84. However, Milliken II funding proved ineffective in making a 
substantial impact on these schools and did not substantially improve student 
achievement. See RYAN, supra note 7, at 108, 159. Moreover, the Milliken II 
opinion reaffirmed the Court's emphasis in Milliken I on local control of schools 
as one of the paramount concerns of a district court when it fashioned a remedy 
for intentional segregation. See Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 280-81 ("[F]ederal 
courts in devising a remedy must take into account the interests of state and 
local authorities in managing their own affairs, consistent with the 
Constitution."). 
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federalism at the expense of the equal educational opportunity that 
effective school desegregation would have provided. In Board of 
Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools, Independent School 
District No. 89 v. Dowell, 69 the Court held that federal courts 
assessing whether a school district should be released from court 
supervision should determine whether the district had complied 
with the desegregation decree in good faith and "whether the 
vestiges of past discrimination had been eliminated to the extent 
practicable."70 The shift in emphasis away from maintaining 
integrated schools is evident from the Court's emphasis on this new 
standard and its silence about the large number of single-race 
schools that would result under the school board's proposed 
neighborhood assignment plan. n 
In stating its reasons for adopting this more lenient standard 
for assessing the implementation of desegregation, the Court in 
Dowell once again trumpeted both the importance of local control of 
the schools and maintaining the balance of power between federal 
and state authorities as the principal rationales for its decision. 72 
By changing the standard for assessing a desegregation plan to 
emphasize the good faith of the school districts and the practicalities 
of implementation, the Court privileged the federalism interests 
over the Court's prior insistence in Green and Swann on an effective 
plan that created integrated schools and uprooted all traces of 
unlawful segregation, including single-race schools.73 The effect of 
the Court's decision was to sanction termination of court oversight of 
a desegregation decree if a school district attempted unsuccessfully 
to integrate its schools. 74 Following the opinion, research revealed 
that other federal courts accepted inadequate results from 
69. 498 u.s. 237 (1991). 
70. Id. at 249-50. 
71. See Robinson, supra note 16, at 823-24. Indeed, under the plan that 
the school district sought to implement, over half of the district's African 
American students would attend schools that enrolled over ninety percent 
African American students, and more than half of the elementary schools would 
be over ninety percent single-race schools. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 242; Dowell v. 
Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Sch., Indep. Dist. No. 89, 890 F.2d 1483, 1487 
(lOth Cir. 1989), reu'd, 498 U.S. 237; Robinson, supra note 16, at 822-23. This 
swift return to a substantial number of single-race schools prompted the Tenth 
Circuit to reject the school district's proposed plan. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 243-44. 
Once the Court sent the case back to the lower court, the lower court 
determined that the school district had met the new standard and the district's 
neighborhood attendance plan resulted in the anticipated return to more than 
half one-race elementary schools. See Bradley W. Joondeph, Missouri v. 
Jenkins and the De Facto Abandonment of Court-Enforced Desegregation, 71 
WASH. L. REV. 597, 655 (1996). 
72. See Dowell, 498 U.S. at 248. 
73. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15, 26 
(1971); Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of New Kent Cnty., 391 U.S. 430, 437-39 (1968). 
74. See Parker, supra note 16, at 1165-67. 
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desegregation plans, including accepting segregation of staff and 
faculty that tracked the racial concentration of students within a 
school that was undoubtedly within the control of school districts. 75 
Thus, as in Milliken I, the Court in Dowell elevated the interests of 
education federalism over and above the interest in ensuring that all 
students receive equal educational opportunity.76 
The Court similarly made education federalism interests 
paramount to equal educational opportunity in its decision in 
Freeman v. Pitts.n In Freeman, the Court considered whether 
school districts must desegregate all of the Green factors 
simultaneously and maintain desegregated schools for a few years 
as the lower court had required. 78 The Court rejected any need for a 
school district that had intentionally segregated students to be 
completely desegregated for any length of time and instead held that 
federal courts could release school districts from court oversight of 
the Green factors in an incremental fashion. 79 Like in its opinion in 
Dowell, the Court underscored the consideration of the good faith 
compliance with court orders rather than the district's success at 
effectively eliminating all vestiges of discrimination.8o 
What is remarkable about Freeman is that the Court openly 
acknowledged the continued effects of past discrimination but 
disclaimed any need or responsibility for the school board to remedy 
those effects despite prior opinions that placed this responsibility on 
intentionally discriminatory school boards. 81 The Court 
unequivocally admitted that "vestiges of past segregation by state 
decree do remain in our society and in our schools. Past wrongs to 
the black race, wrongs committed by the State and in its name, are a 
stubborn fact of history. And stubborn facts of history linger and 
persist."82 Nevertheless, the Court opined that the good faith 
compliance of the school board served as a sufficient basis to 
terminate the board's responsibility for racial segregation in the 
district and to shift that responsibility to demographic factors 
75. See Robinson, supra note 16, at 824. 
76. See Parker, supra note 16, at 1166, 1178 (noting that the Court used 
the importance of local control of schools as a reason to absolve or pardon the 
segregation that remained in the schools); Robinson, supra note 16, at 824-25 
("The emphasis on local control exempted defendants from having to address 
persistent racial segregation and expressed a 'value choice' by the Court that 
the need to end court-supervised desegregation was paramount and that efforts 
to desegregate could be abandoned." (footnotes omitted)). 
77. 503 U.S. 467, 489 (1992). 
78. See id. at 471. 
79. Id. 
80. See id. at 491-92. 
81. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 
(1971); Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of New Kent Cnty., 391 U.S. 430, 438 & n.4 
(1968). 
82. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 495. 
302 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48 
beyond the district's control.S3 The Court did not explain how the 
mere passage of time heals the ongoing effects of past 
discrimination. Instead, it appears that the Court simply believed 
that the time for desegregation had come and gone and that the 
nation needed to move on to other more pressing matters.s4 
In upholding the validity of partial withdrawal of court 
supervision over desegregating school districts, the Court again 
emphasized the importance of returning the school district to local 
control.85 Indeed, although the Court acknowledged that court 
intervention in school desegregation seeks both to remedy the 
constitutional violation and to restore state and local authority over 
the schools, the Court emphasized the primacy of the local control 
objective by describing local control as "the ultimate objective" of 
school desegregation.ss The Court sanctioned incremental 
termination of court supervision as one way to uphold this "vital 
national tradition."S7 Indeed, the Court opinion makes clear that 
the value of local control of schools outweighed the need to hold the 
school district responsible for the effects of its discrimination or to 
maintain a completely desegregated school district for even one day, 
let alone one school year.ss Thus, Freeman provides another 
example of the Court privileging education federalism interests over 
an effective desegregation plan that would offer students equal 
educational opportunity. 
83. See Parker, supra note 16, at 1170-71; James E. Ryan, The Limited 
Influence of Social Science Evidence in Modern Desegregation Cases, 81 N.C. L. 
REV. 1659, 1671 (2003). The Court justified incremental termination of court 
supervision by disclaiming any necessary connection between demographic 
shifts and an intentional constitutional violation. See Freeman, 503 U.S. at 
496. The Court explained that as years increase since the violation, the 
likelihood decreases that the violation caused existing racial imbalances in 
schools. !d. 
84. In contrast, the Justices who concurred in the judgment that districts 
could be incrementally released from court supervision criticized the majority's 
failure to recognize that the school district's maintenance of Mrican American 
schools and white schools may have influenced the demographic changes within 
the district. See Freeman, 503 U.S. at 515 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The 
concurring Justices further noted that the school district remained responsible 
for remedying the effect of segregation on the school system given the Court's 
prior requirements in cases like Green that demanded that school boards 
eliminate all effects of their prior discrimination. See id. at 511, 514. 
85. See id. at 489 (majority opinion) ("Partial relinquishment of judicial 
control, where justified by the facts of the case, can be an important and 
significant step in fulfilling the district court's duty to return the operations and 
control of schools to local authorities."). 
86. See id. (emphasis added). 
87. See id. at 489-90 (quoting Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 
406, 410 (1977)). 
88. See id. at 509 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
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Finally, the Court's decision in Missouri v. JenkinsB9 revealed a 
similar preference for education federalism interests over an 
effective desegregation plan. In Jenkins, the lower courts had 
ordered the state to remedy its intentional segregation of students 
in the Kansas City, Missouri, school district and the resulting white 
flight and substandard educational achievement by improving the 
educational opportunities in the district so that white students 
would be voluntarily attracted back to the district. 90 The lower 
courts found that an efficacious desegregation remedy was 
unattainable without an interdistrict approach that drew white 
students into the mostly minority school district.91 Nevertheless, 
the Supreme Court overturned the plan because the goal of 
attracting students back to the district-even on a voluntary basis-
was not justified in the absence of evidence that the state had 
intentionally segregated students between districts.92 
Like Milliken, Dowell, and Freeman before it, the Court in 
Jenkins emphasized the importance of local control of education 
rather than lasting and meaningful desegregation.93 The Court 
noted that the programs required by the lower courts to improve the 
school district and its attractiveness to white students in 
surrounding school districts, such as raising teacher salaries and 
improving the quality of the education programs, increased the 
school district's reliance on the state and ultimately on the district 
court for oversight.94 This reliance undermined the "vital national 
tradition" of local control over schools.95 Rather than proposing an 
alternative effective remedy that would integrate the heavily 
minority school district, the Court invalidated the remedial 
programs and efforts to improve the schools and the students' test 
scores while repeatedly reminding the federal courts that they must 
work to reinstate state and local authority over the school system 
once the system is in compliance with the Constitution.96 
The emphasis on local control of education in the Court's 
decisions in Milliken, Dowell, Freeman, and Jenkins harkened back 
to dual federalism's insistence that the federal government and the 
89. 515 u.s. 70 (1995). 
90. Jenkins v. Missouri, 11 F.3d 755, 759 (8th Cir. 1993), rev'd, 515 U.S. 
70. 
91. See Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 90-91, 94. 
92. See id. at 94-99. 
93. See id. at 98-99, 102. 
94. Id. at 99. 
95. Id. 
96. See id. at 99, 102. However, even if one accepts that local control of 
education was the norm when Milliken I was decided-a contention that I 
dispute in the text, see infra text accompanying notes 98-103--other research 
has demonstrated that, by the time that Jenkins was rendered, local control no 
longer served as the principal organizing principle for school governance in the 
United States. See Liu, supra note 16, at 731. 
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state governments divide authority based on subject matter.97 
However, consistent with the demise of dual federalism and the rise 
of cooperative federalism,9B education law and policy at the time of 
these decisions had evolved such that, at a minimum, federal 
authority had been sanctioned and deemed essential to ensuring 
equal educational opportunity. This occurred not only through the 
landmark Brown decisions and other desegregation decisions that 
used federal power to ensure integrated schools but also through the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 ("ESEA'') and its 
reauthorizations that marshaled federal authority to assist low-
income students;99 numerous additional federal education laws on 
issues of equal opportunity for girls and women, wo disabled 
students,lDl and English language learners;102 and federal 
enforcement of these laws by the U.S. Department of Education. In 
the Milliken, Dowell, Freeman, and Jenkins decisions, this 
insistence on a dualist understanding of education failed to protect 
the right to attend a nondiscriminatory school system, just as it has 
failed to protect individual rights in other areas.1oa 
These decisions-along with several other factors, such as the 
retreat of many white and middle class families to the suburbs and 
the intermittent support for federal action by the executive and 
legislative branches-have led to resegregation of many of the 
nation's schoolsJ04 Despite growing diversity in the public school 
population, school segregation has been increasing in recent decades 
97. RYAN, supra note 21; SCHAPIRO, supra note 21, at 3. 
98. See RYAN, supra note 21. 
99. See Derek W. Black, The Congressional Failure to Enforce Equal 
Protection Through the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 90 B.U. L. 
REV. 313, 336-39 (2010) (noting that the original intent and structure of Title I 
was to provide assistance to low-income students but also analyzing how 
Congress diluted and undermined this purpose over time). 
100. See Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 
(2006). 
101. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S. C. § 1400 (2006) 
(previously Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 
94-142, 89 Stat. 773). 
102. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 566-68 (1974) (noting that Title VI of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and HEW guidelines interpreting that law required 
school districts receiving federal financial assistance to rectify any language 
barrier that impeded English language learners' access to education). 
103. See SCHAPIRO, supra note 21 (noting how reliance on dual federalism 
has led to "mistaken rulings and bad policy" and has been used as a reason for 
striking down "statutes keeping guns out of schools, protecting women from 
violence, preserving intellectual property from state infringement, and 
requiring compensation for state employees for workplace wrongs ranging from 
age and disability discrimination to failure to honor minimum wage and 
overtime requirements" (footnotes omitted)). 
104. GARY 0RFIELD ET AL., THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, E 
PLURIBUS ... SEPARATION: DEEPENING DOUBLE SEGREGATION FOR MORE 
STUDENTS, at xvii-xix (2012). 
2013] HIGH COST OF EDUCATION FEDERALISM 305 
and has led to increasingly racially isolated schoolsJ05 For instance, 
the percentage of Latino and African American students who attend 
schools composed of 90%-100% minority students has consistently 
grown since the 1991-92 school year.106 In the 2009-10 school year, 
43.1% of Latino students and 38.1% of African American students 
attended schools in which 90%-100% of the students are minorities, 
up from 33.9% and 32.7% respectively in 1991-92.107 In addition, 
the percentage of poor students has grown significantly in the last 
three decades, with the average African American and Hispanic 
student attending a school that was one-third poor students in the 
early 1990s while today these students typically attend a school 
with two-thirds poor studentsJOS These trends are made even more 
troubling when one considers research that consistently documents 
the harms of racial isolation and the benefits of diverse schools.l09 
Furthermore, research reveals that concentrated poverty has a 
stronger relationship to inequality in education than racial 
segregation_llO Education federalism contributed to these troubling 
trends by serving as one of the impediments to school desegregation. 
The next Subpart considers whether the Supreme Court's 
decision in Parents Involved establishes that the Court's professed 
concerns about education federalism merely disguised its lack of 
interest in meaningful desegregation. 
B. Parents Involved and Education Federalism 
The Court's decision in Parents Involved in Community Schools 
v. Seattle School District No. 1 can be viewed as a departure from 
the Court's prior interest in preserving local control of public 
schools.lll In Parents Involved, the Court struck down voluntary 
student assignment plans that were adopted by the school districts 
in Seattle and Louisville because the districts failed to prove that 
the use of race was necessary and that the districts had given good-
faith consideration to race-neutral alternatives.n2 The decision 
departs from past decisions' emphasis on local control because the 
Court refused to defer to the decision of the school boards on their 
105. Id. at 75-76. 
106. See id. at 19 tbl.3. 
107. See id. at 19 tbl.2. 
108. Id. at 76. 
109. See Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Constitutional Future of Race-
Neutral Efforts to Achieve Diversity and Avoid Racial Isolation in Elementary 
and Secondary Schools, 50 B.C. L. REV. 277, 327-35 (2009). 
110. See ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 104, at 76 (citing Sean F. Reardon et al., 
The Changing Structure of School Segregation: Measurement and Evidence of 
Multiracial Metropolitan-Area School Segregation, 1989-1995, 37 DEMOGRAPHY 
351 (2000)). 
111. See Ryan, supra note 26, at 73, 89. 
112. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 
733-35 (2007). 
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need for the plan and the ineffectiveness of race-neutral 
alternatives, despite being urged to do so in numerous briefs.ll3 The 
refusal to reaffirm local control may suggest that the Court's prior 
interest in preserving local control may have simply represented a 
convenient cover for its lack of willingness to ensure effective school 
desegregation,114 Indeed, elsewhere I have argued that Parents 
Involved merely continued the Court's affirmation of a return to 
segregated schools.115 
Nevertheless, assuming for the sake of argument that the 
Court's interest in the preservation of state and local control was 
genuine in prior cases, an alternative interpretation of Parents 
Involved also should be considered. Parents Involved may simply 
reveal that even the strong preference for local control does not 
outweigh the Court's increasingly stronger preference for an end to 
the use of race-based classifications,116 The plurality admonished 
districts to end the use of classifications when it stated that "[t]he 
way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop 
discriminating on the basis of race."ll7 Although Justice Kennedy 
wrote separately to reaffirm that districts may continue to adopt 
student assignment plans to reduce racial isolation and promote 
diversity,ns he has yet to review an affirmative action plan that 
meets the highly demanding criteria that he applies to race-based 
action.ll9 Indeed, his questions in the Fisher v. University of Texas 
at Austin120 oral argument suggest that he will vote to strike down 
the use of race in that case even though it was limited to a small 
number of students and adopted only after the University of Texas 
113. See, e.g., Brief of the NAACP as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Respondents at 6, Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701 (Nos. 05-908, 05-915), 2006 
WL 2927073, at *6, *11; Brief of The Nat'l Parent Teacher Ass'n as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Respondents at 18, Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701 (Nos. 
05-908, 05-915), 2006 WL 2882699, at *18; Brief of Nat'l Sch. Bds. Ass'n et al. as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 3, Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701 
(Nos. 05-908, 05-915), 2006 WL 2925968, at *3. 
114. See Ryan, supra note 26, at 89-91 (noting that the desegregation cases 
do not prove that the Court cannot accomplish social change but instead show 
that "the Court was unwilling to press hard to achieve lasting school 
integration"). 
115. See Robinson, supra note 16, at 837-38. 
116. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505-06 (1989); 
DONALD LIVELY, THE CONSTITUTION, RACE, AND RENEWED RELEVANCE OF 
ORIGINAL INTENT 187 (2008) ("The Court's investment in constitutional color 
blindness in the late twentieth century was the precursor of growing references 
to a post-racial society in the early twenty-first century."). 
117. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 748. 
118. See id. at 787-89 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
119. See Adam Liptak, Justices Take Up Race as a Factor in College Entry, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2012, at Al. 
120. 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S.Ct. 1536 (2012) 
(mem.). 
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had attempted to achieve diversity through other means.121 Under 
this reading of Parents Involved, ending the use of racial 
classifications-or one that effectively accomplishes that under 
Justice Kennedy's approach-outweighed the still-substantial 
interest in local control. 
Ultimately, although one can plausibly read Parents Involved as 
suggesting that local control did not serve as a paramount interest 
in the preceding school desegregation cases, the decision does not 
disprove that local control and maintaining the existing balance of 
federal and state authority served as important interests that 
limited the reach of school desegregation. These interests may still 
have guided the Court's decisions on school desegregation from 
Milliken I onward. Instead, Parents Involved may reveal that 
although these interests remain essential, even they must yield to 
other predominant principles in a particular case. 
The next Part explores the influence of education federalism on 
school finance litigation. 
II. EDUCATION FEDERALISM AND SCHOOL FINANCE LITIGATION 
Once the attention shifted away from school desegregation, 
some reformers pursued school finance litigation to challenge 
disparities in educational opportunity.l22 These reformers scored an 
initial victory in 1971 in the California Supreme Court's decision in 
Serrano v. Priest, in which the court held that education was a 
fundamental interest and that substantial disparities in per-pupil 
financing in California violated the Federal Equal Protection Clause 
and its California equivalent.123 However, reformers quickly met a 
roadblock to federal lawsuits on these issues in the U.S. Supreme 
Court. This Part examines how federalism influenced the Supreme 
Court's decision to foreclose federal school finance litigation. It then 
analyzes research that considers whether state school finance 
reform and litigation have been an effective alternative for ensuring 
that all students receive equal educational opportunity. 
A. Closing the Door to Federal School Finance Litigation 
The Court ruled in its 1973 decision in San Antonio 
Independent School District v. Rodriguez124 that the Constitution did 
not recognize education as a fundamental right and rejected 
121. See Adam Liptak, Justices Weigh Race as a Factor at Universities, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 11, 2012, at Al. 
122. See Melissa C. Carr & Susan H. Fuhrman, The Politics of School 
Finance in the 1990s, in EQUITY AND ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION FINANCE: ISSUES 
AND PERSPECTIVES 136, 143 (Helen F. Ladd et al. eds., 1999). 
123. Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I), 487 P.2d 1241, 1244, 1249 n.ll (Cal. 
1971); Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), 557 P.2d 929, 957-58 (Cal. 1976); see also 
Carr & Fuhrman, supra note 122. 
124. 411 u.s. 1 (1973). 
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plaintiffs' arguments that the Texas school financing scheme 
discriminated on the basis of wealth.125 Mexican American parents 
of children in schools in the Edgewood Independent School District, 
a city school district in San Antonio, Texas, sued the state on behalf 
of minority schoolchildren and those poor children who lived in 
districts with a relatively low base for property taxes.126 The 
plaintiffs alleged that the Texas school finance system discriminated 
against a suspect class and infringed upon education as a 
fundamental rightJ27 They emphasized the wide disparities in per-
pupil spending throughout the state.12s The federal district court 
held that the Texas system for financing schools violated the 
Federal Equal Protection Clause because it discriminated on the 
basis of wealth by allowing wealthier districts to provide a higher-
quality education while paying lower taxes than less affluent 
districtsJ29 The lower court found that although Texas claimed that 
the system promoted local control and the ability of parents to 
determine how much to spend on their child's education, in reality 
"the state has, in truth and in fact, limited the choice of financing by 
guaranteeing that 'some districts will spend low (with high taxes) 
while others will spend high (with low taxes)."'130 
The Supreme Court reversed and held that the Texas scheme 
neither discriminated on the basis of wealth nor infringed upon a 
fundamental right.131 The Court rejected the wealth discrimination 
claim because the class, according to the Court, was not clearly 
defined, nor did the class bear the hallmarks of a suspect class, such 
as a history of past discrimination or a lack of political power. 132 
The Court further held that the Constitution neither explicitly nor 
implicitly protected education as a fundamental right and that the 
importance of education could not render it a fundamental right. 133 
Even though an education is necessary to exercise the right to speak 
and to vote, the Court noted that the Constitution did not guarantee 
125. See id. at 6, 18-19, 28, 35. 
126. !d. at 4-5. 
127. See id. at 17. 
128. See id. at 15. For instance, the Edgewood Independent School District 
adopted the highest tax rate in the San Antonio area but, given its low property 
value, was only able to raise $26 per pupil and to spend a total of $356 per pupil 
when state and federal funds were added to the local contribution. See id. at 
12. In contrast, Alamo Heights, the most property-rich district in San Antonio, 
raised $333 per pupil with a lower tax rate and spent a total of $594 per pupil. 
See id. at 13. 
129. See id. at 6; Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 337 F. Supp. 
280, 285 (W.D. Tex. 1971), rev'd, 411 U.S. 1. 
130. Rodriguez, 337 F. Supp. at 284 (quoting Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. 
Supp. 870, 876 (D. Minn. 1971)). 
131. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 6, 18-19, 28, 35. 
132. !d. at 28. 
133. Id. at 33, 35. 
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that either right must be exercised to its fullest extent.t34 
Furthermore, the plaintiffs had only alleged a relative deprivation of 
educational opportunity and had failed to allege an absolute denial 
of education or that the state had denied each child the chance to 
obtain "the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the 
rights of speech and of full participation in the political process."t35 
In the absence of a fundamental right, the Court reviewed the 
disparities in educational opportunity under the rational basis 
standard and found that the system rationally advanced local 
control of education_136 The Court explained that in matters of tax 
policy and education policy, it lacked the expertise to interfere with 
state and local decisions_137 Given the debates about the 
relationship between quality and school expenditures, the goals of 
education, and the proper allocation of authority between state and 
local governments, the Court noted that wisdom counseled against it 
imposing constitutional requirements upon the states that could 
hinder them from discovering possible solutions to the challenges 
they confront when designing school funding systems.tas For these 
reasons, the Court held that the Texas school funding system was 
rationally related to a legitimate state interest in local control of 
education.139 
Like the school desegregation cases, the Rodriguez Court relied 
heavily on two interrelated education federalism interests when it 
rejected the plaintiffs' claims: maintaining the existing balance of 
power between the federal and state governments and ensuring 
local control of schools.140 The Court indicated that it wanted to 
maintain the existing balance of power when it noted that the 
plaintiffs were essentially asking the Court to invalidate the school 
finance systems in all flfty states.141 In rejecting the plaintiffs' 
claims, the Court acknowledged that, although all equal protection 
claims implicate federalism, "it would be difficult to imagine a case 
having a greater potential impact on our federal system than the 
one now before us."l42 The Court explained that its understanding 
of the proper allocation of federal and state power also guided its 
application of the rational basis standard to determine the 
constitutionality of the existing school finance system.143 
Furthermore, invalidating the property tax as a means of funding 
134. See id. at 36. 
135. Id. at 37. 
136. See id. at 40, 49-53. 
137. See id. at 40-42. 
138. Id. at 43. 
139. See id. at 54-55. 
140. See id. at 42-44, 49-50. 
141. See id. at 47-48, 54-55. 
142. Id. at 44. 
143. See id. 
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schools could implicate the funding of other public services that rely 
on property taxes.144 
The Court's opinion also emphasized the nation's long-standing 
commitment to local control of education and the benefits that it 
secures for education. According to the Court, local control of 
education enables communities to create programs that are tailored 
to the needs of their students.145 Like the relationship between the 
federal government and the state, local control also provides "some 
opportunity for experimentation, innovation, and a healthy 
competition for educational excellence."146 In fact, the Court claimed 
that no social issue could benefit more from a variety of viewpoints 
and approaches than education.147 The Court further explained that 
even though centralization of government represented a growing 
trend, local oversight of schools has remained one of the hallmarks 
of the American education system.148 
The Court also reaffirmed the freedom of Texas residents to 
choose a system that favored local control over greater equality. The 
plaintiffs had acknowledged the numerous benefits of local control 
but had contended that local control could be preserved while 
simultaneously narrowing the disparities in educational opportunity 
that pervaded the system.149 The Court responded that, under the 
rational basis standard, Texas was not required to choose the least 
restrictive approach to accomplish its goals.150 Instead, given the 
many benefits of local control of education, the Court noted that 
Texas residents might justifiably conclude that additional state 
control over school finances would result in an undesirable increase 
in state control over school decisions.151 The Court also noted its 
unwillingness to claim that its assessment of the Texas system was 
superior to that of the educators, scholars, and state lawmakers 
throughout the nation.152 In reaching this conclusion, the Court 
again chose to preserve education federalism at the expense of equal 
educational opportunity.153 
144. See id. at 54. 
145. ld. at 50. 
146. ld. 
147. ld. 
148. See id. at 49. 
149. See id. at 50. 
150. See id. at 50-51. In rejecting the plaintiffs' contention that the system 
of financing schools should not depend upon the ''happenstance" of the amount 
of taxable property in each district, the Court responded that all jurisdictional 
boundaries in taxation schemes are arbitrary and that localities may influence 
the amount of taxable property by attracting businesses to the locality. See id. 
at 53-54. 
151. !d. at 51-53. 
152. ld. at 55. 
153. See Liu, supra note 16, at 724 ("[I]n Rodriguez . .. deference to local 
control led the Court to retreat from the imperative of equal educational 
opportunity."). 
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In privileging the interests of federalism over equal educational 
opportunity, the Court insulated inequitable disparities in 
educational opportunity from federal judicial oversight. Instead of 
considering how these disparities could be addressed, the Court 
treated these disparities, "however avoidable and 'unjust,' as 
nothing more than an unfortunate and unactionable byproduct of 
the 'vital national tradition' of local control."154 This approach fails 
to account for the vital national interest in equal educational 
opportunity that the Court recognized in Brown [.155 
Furthermore, as occurred in the school desegregation decisions, 
the Rodriguez Court's insistence on the primacy of state and local 
control of education paints a dualist portrait of education law and 
policy that did not exist when the Court decided the case.l56 This 
dualist portrait fails to protect individual rights and to understand 
the importance of a federal role in ensuring equal educational 
opportunity that is evidenced in Brown I, the ESEA, and other 
federal laws requiring equal educational opportunity.l57 The five-to-
four vote in the case signifies that the dissenting Justices did not 
share this dualist understanding of education federalism. Instead, 
the four dissenting Justices concluded that the Texas system did not 
provide local control to those districts with a low property tax base 
because "no matter how desirous parents are of supporting their 
schools with greater revenues, it is impossible to do so through the 
use of the real estate property tax" given the value of the property 
within those districts and the state law limits on the tax rate.l5B 
Therefore, the Texas funding scheme failed to satisfy the rational 
basis standard.l59 In fact, the dissenting Justices concluded that the 
majority made its equal protection analysis into nothing "more than 
an empty gesture" because it failed to require Texas to establish how 
the approach it adopted was rationally related to the goal of local 
contro}.l60 Numerous scholars agree with the dissenting Justices 
and contend that Rodriguez was wrongly decided.l61 
154. Id. at 727 (footnote omitted). 
155. See Brown v. Bd. ofEduc. (Brown I), 347 U.S 483,493 (1954). 
156. See MANNA, COLLISION COURSE, supra note 3, at 5; SCHAPIRO, supra note 
21. 
157. See supra text accompanying notes 99-103; see also MANNA, CoLLISION 
COURSE, supra note 3, at 5 ("Since the 1960s, developments in federal 
[education] policy have reflected this equity theme."). 
158. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 64-67 (1973) 
(White, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
159. See id. at 67-68. 
160. See id. 
161. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16 ("The Court held that there is no 
constitutional right to education and thus that differentials in spending 
between wealthy and poor school districts within a metropolitan area are 
constitutionally permissible. If I were to list the most important, and the worst, 
Supreme Court decisions during my lifetime, Rodriguez would be high on this 
list."); Thomas Kleven, The Democratic Right to Full Bilingual Education, 7 
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Scholars also raise substantial arguments that Rodriguez no 
longer remains applicable law. Since the Court decided Rodriguez, 
scholars have noted that even if one agrees with the 
characterization of the importance of local control that the Court 
trumpets in the decision, local control of education no longer 
remains the prevalent approach to education federalism within the 
United States,162 Instead, numerous scholars have noted the 
growing centralization of education at the state and federal levels 
beginning in the 1980s and through NCLBJ63 Although states only 
provided a small share of education budgets when Rodriguez was 
decided, states now serve as the primary funders of education.164 
Education law scholar Derek Black also has persuasively 
demonstrated that the federalism concerns that limited the Court's 
decision in Rodriguez would no longer limit the Court's actions 
today,I65 He further argued that states have already created rights 
to education that would enable the Court to find that the Equal 
Protection Clause demands that the states implement their 
education laws to ensure that districts possess the essential 
educational resources that they require to provide state-defined 
rights to education,166 
Some also have suggested that the need to preserve local 
control, particularly suburban local control, has been used by the 
Supreme Court as an excuse for limiting school desegregation and 
school finance reform,l67 This suggests that education federalism 
may simply have been a shield that the Court hid behind when it 
lacked the will to interpret federal law in a way that would ensure 
that students enjoyed the equal educational opportunity that Brown 
NEV. L.J. 933, 939 (2007); David A.J. Richards, Equal Opportunity and School 
Financing: Towards a Moral Theory of Constitutional Adjudication, 41 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 32, 70 (1973) ("If one believes in principled and reasoned constitutional 
adjudication, Rodriguez must be disappointing, for it is not supported by sound 
constitutional principles or moral or legal reasoning. The majority could not 
have reached this decision had it given precise thought to the nature and 
weight of the moral concept of equal opportunity."). But see Jeffrey S. Sutton, 
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez and Its Aftermath, 94 VA. 
L. REV. 1963, 1977-78 (2008) (arguing that Rodriguez led to school funding 
reform at the state level). 
162. See Black, supra note 10, at 1405-06; Michael Heise, The Political 
Economy of Education Federalism, 56 EMORY L.J. 125, 131 (2006); James E. 
Ryan, The Tenth Amendment and Other Paper Tigers: The Legal Boundaries of 
Education Governance, in WHO'S IN CHARGE HERE?: THE TANGLED WEB OF 
SCHOOL GOVERNANCE AND POLICY 42, 60 (Noel Epstein ed., 2004). 
163. See Black, supra note 10, at 1402-03; Heise, supra note 162; Liu, supra 
note 16, at 730-31; Ryan, supra note 162. 
164. See Black, supra note 10, at 1403. 
165. Id. at 1395-1406. 
166. See id. at 1405-06. 
167. RYAN, supra note 7, at 212; see also Liu, supra note 16, at 726. 
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I proclaimed was their right.I68 As noted in Part LA, proving or 
disproving the genuineness of the Court's rationale can be quite 
difficult, although some believe that Parents Involved provides 
substantial evidence that, in the context of school desegregation, the 
strong preference for local control was not as genuine as the Court 
professed in earlier cases.169 
Yet, if one gives credence to the authenticity of the Court's 
rationales in these cases, one also can identify several reasons why 
the Court might genuinely deflect an invitation to uphold remedies 
that would overturn, or at least significantly alter, the American 
tradition of state and local control over schools and limited federal 
power in this arena. First, the Court might honestly believe that it 
simply is not the institution to decide whether this tradition should 
continue given its lack of expertise on education issues and its 
undemocratic nature_l70 Instead, the Court might view the states, 
or even Congress, as better suited to decide the continuing value of 
this American tradition. Second, the Court in Rodriguez might have 
found the split of opinion on pivotal education policy issues-such as 
whether additional resources would improve student outcomes-as 
sufficient reason to stay its hand.171 Finally, the Court may have 
believed that it lacked the capacity and resources to accept federal 
oversight of school desegregation and the nation's school finance 
systems in perpetuity. 
Undoubtedly, a Court that privileged equal educational 
opportunity over these other competing values could have overcome 
each of these obstacles. Indeed, numerous scholars have argued 
that the Court should have decided the school desegregation cases 
and Rodriguez differently,172 and I find many of their arguments 
168. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 1), 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
169. See Suzanne Eckes, Public School Integration and the 'Cruel Irony' of 
the Decision in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School 
District No. 1, 229 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 14 (2008); Daniel P. Tokaji, Desegregation, 
Discrimination and Democracy: Parents Involved's Disregard for Process, 69 
OHIO ST. L.J. 847, 861-62 (2008). 
170. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 58 (1973); 
Jesse H. Choper, The Supreme Court and the Political Branches, 122 U. PA. L. 
REV. 810, 811 (1974) (noting that the Supreme Court and federal judges "appear 
to be wholly without political responsibility''). 
171. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 56--58. 
172. For arguments that the Supreme Court reached the wrong decision in 
Rodriguez, see Chemerinsky, supra note 18, at 121 ("The Court had the 
opportunity to remedy this inequality in education in [Rodriguez] ... [b]ut the 
court profoundly failed."); Ian Millhiser, What Happens to a Dream Deferred?: 
Cleansing the Taint of San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 
55 DUKE L.J. 405, 418 (2005). For scholars who have argued that the school 
desegregation decisions were wrongly decided, see Millhisen, supra, at 421-22. 
at 421-22; Bradley W. Joondeph, Killing Brown Softly: The Subtle 
Undermining of Effective Desegregation in Freeman v. Pitts, 46 STAN. L. REV. 
147, 157 (1993); J. John Harris et al., The Curious Case of Missouri v. Jenkins: 
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quite compelling. Given the fact that the Court has shown no signs 
of reversing its decisions in these areas, I believe that a viable 
alternative to demanding that the Court restructure education 
federalism lies in inviting the nation to reexamine its understanding 
of education federalism and insisting on an understanding that 
supports and even demands equal educational opportunity. I 
propose such an understanding of education federalism in a future 
work.173 
The Court in Rodriguez intentionally deferred the questions 
raised by disparities in school finance systems to the states174 but 
simultaneously acknowledged the need for reform. The Court called 
for reform of school finance systems in stating: 
The need is apparent for reform in tax systems which may well 
have relied too long and too heavily on the local property tax. 
And certainly innovative thinking as to public education, its 
methods, and its funding is necessary to assure both a higher 
level of quality and greater uniformity of opportunity.175 
The Court expressly noted the need for innovation to ensure 
that public education and its funding schemes provide improved 
quality and greater equality of educational opportunity. Therefore, 
Rodriguez leaves those seeking equal educational opportunity 
through school finance systems to the patchwork of state remedies 
to address these disparities. The next Subpart reveals that in some 
states these remedies have helped to reduce disparities in 
educational opportunity, but they have proved inadequate at 
systematically ensuring equal educational opportunity throughout 
the nation. 
B. The Limitations of State School Finance Litigation and Reform 
In rejecting the plaintiffs' challenges to school finance 
disparities, the Supreme Court in Rodriguez opined that state and 
local governments should be the entities to undertake revisions to 
school finance systems that promote equality of educational 
opportunity.176 Since Rodriguez, most states have reformed their 
school funding system in response to litigation or the threat of 
litigation or at the initiation of the legislature.m However, research 
reveals that, in spite of these efforts and some reduction in 
disparities in educational opportunity in some states, school finance 
The End of the Road for Court-Ordered Desegregation?, 66 J. NEGRO Enuc. 43, 
44 (1997). 
173. See Robinson, supra note 20. 
174. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 58--59. 
175. Id. at 58. 
176. See id. 
177. See Black, supra note 10, at 1360-65; Sutton, supra note 161, at 1971. 
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systems continue to result in significant and inequitable disparities 
in educational opportunity.178 
Litigation reform efforts after Rodriguez have sought equity in 
school finance under state equal protection or education clauses, 
adequacy under state education clauses, or some combination 
thereof.179 Equity claims oftentimes request reforms to school 
finance systems that enable students to receive equal per-pupil 
funding or the guaranteed opportunity to provide equal funding.1so 
Adequacy claims seek sufficient funding to ensure that each child 
obtains an education that offers a specified level of knowledge or 
skills.lBl In spite of the different labels attached to each type of 
claim, both claims typically seek greater equity in school funding as 
their ultimate objective.1s2 
When pursuing school finance litigation, many plaintiffs have 
found the state courthouse doors closed to them by courts who 
viewed the determination of school finance systems to be the sole 
discretion of state legislatures. For instance, the Florida Supreme 
Court rejected a school finance case because it would have required 
the judiciary to invade the duties of the legislature.183 The Illinois 
and Rhode Island Supreme Courts turned away school finance 
plaintiffs for similar reasons.184 Research indicates that when 
states prevail in school finance litigation they oftentimes reduce 
state funding for education and thus leave locals to offset these 
reductions .185 
Generally, plaintiffs who primarily sought adequacy claims 
have proven more successful than those bringing equity-focused 
claims, although each type of claim has enjoyed success in some 
states.186 More than half of the highest state courts have upheld 
178. See THE EQUITY & EXCELLENCE COMM'N, supra note 9, at 17, 19; BRUCE 
D. BAKER ET AL., EDUC. LAw CTR., Is SCHOOL FUNDING FAIR? A NATIONAL REPORT 
CARD 26-27 (2d ed. 2012); Black, supra note 10, at 1370-71. 
179. See RYAN, supra note 7, at 149 (challenging the typical scholarly 
characterization of school finance as proceeding in three waves); Black, supra 
note 10, at 1360-64 (describing three waves of school finance litigation). 
180. See RYAN, supra note 7, at 149; see, e.g., Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 
384, 390 (Vt. 1997). 
181. See RYAN, supra note 7, at 149; see, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better 
Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989). 
182. See RYAN, supra note 7, at 150-51. 
183. Coal. for Adequacy & Fairness in Sch. Funding v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d 
400, 408 (Fla. 1996). 
184. See Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1189 (Ill. 1996); 
City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 58 (R.I. 1995); see also RYAN, supra 
note 7, at 147-48 (noting that some scholars applaud such decisions). 
185. Christopher Berry, The Impact of School Finance Judgments on State 
Fiscal Policy, in SCHOOL MONEY TRIALS: THE LEGAL PURSUIT OF EDUCATIONAL 
ADEQUACY 213, 233 (Martin R. West & Paul E. Peterson eds., 2007). 
186. See Black, supra note 10, 1362-65. 
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plaintiffs' claims challenging school finance systems,187 For 
instance, the California Supreme Court struck down its school 
finance system first under the Federal Equal Protection Clause188 
and, after Rodriguez, under the state equal protection clause, 189 
noting that the local control of school funding that the state sought 
to promote represented "a cruel illusion for the poor school 
districts."190 The New Jersey Supreme Court held that inequities in 
its funding system violated the state education clause that 
guaranteed a "thorough and efficient" education,191 The Kentucky 
Supreme Court's ruling for the plaintiffs identified the knowledge 
and skills that students must possess upon leaving the school 
system and required the legislature to establish a system that 
accomplished that result,192 The New Hampshire Supreme Court 
defined an adequate education based upon students' roles in 
societyJ93 
In response to successful litigation-or sometimes merely the 
threat of litigation-some states have reformed their school finance 
systems, including reforms in numerous states that provide 
additional aid to low-income students, students with special needs, 
and English language learners.l94 For instance, New Jersey stands 
out as a state in which litigation and political mobilization have led 
to some of the most progressive reforms to its education system. In 
response to more than a dozen court decisions insisting that the 
legislature make changes, the New Jersey legislature redistributed 
large amounts of state aid to poor urban school systems, including 
approximately $3.5 to $4 billion in basic education aid that these 
districts otherwise would not have receivedJ95 The Kentucky school 
finance litigation, along with a concurrent political strategy, led to 
an overhaul of the Kentucky education system, an increase in 
revenue for education from both state and local sources, and a 
187. See id. at 1397. 
188. Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I), 487 P.2d 1241,1244 (Cal. 1971). 
189. Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), 557 P.2d 929, 957-58 (Cal. 1976). 
190. Serrano I, 487 P.2d at 1260. 
191. Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 295 (N.J. 1973). 
192. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212-13 (Ky. 
1989). 
193. Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375, 1381 (N.H. 1993). 
194. See DAVID HURST ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, OVERVIEW 
AND INVENTORY OF STATE EDUCATION REFORMS: 1990 TO 2000, at 40 (2003), 
available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2003/2003020.pdf; Sean P. Corcoran & 
William N. Evans, Equity, Adequacy and the Evolving State Role in Education 
Finance, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH IN EDUCATION FINANCE AND POLICY 332, 334 
(Helen F. Ladd & Edward B. Fiske eds., 2008); Robinson, supra note 19, at 
1670; Deborah A. Verstegen & Teresa S. Jordan, A Fifty-State Survey of School 
Finance Policies and Programs: An Overview, 34 J. EDUC. FIN. 213, 224 (2009). 
195. See MICHAEL PARIS, FRAMING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY: LAW AND THE 
POLITICS OF SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM 147 (2010); RYAN, supra note 7, at 172. 
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substantial reduction of the spending disparity between poor and 
rich districts.l96 
Overall, most research indicates that school finance litigation 
has resulted in additional funding for education, particularly for 
poor districts, and has reduced inequities in funding schools.l97 In 
addition, a study of school finance inequality from 1972 to 2002 
found that decreases in inequality in school finance have followed 
periods of court activity while inequality rose or remained steady 
during periods of relative inactivity. 198 Although most, but not all, 
studies generally agree that litigation has had a positive impact on 
education finance by raising educational spending and reducing 
interdistrict spending disparities, 199 the studies disagree over the 
impact and influence of this litigation. For instance, one study 
found a nineteen to thirty-four percent reduction in intrastate 
spending disparities,2oo while another more recent study found it to 
be sixteen percent.2o1 The later study also found that litigation has 
reduced inequities in spending, but that the net effect has often been 
quite limited because state spending increases are often offset by 
decreases at the local level.202 One promising trend is that states 
have begun to provide additional funding for students with 
additional needs, such as low-income students and special education 
students.203 Although the size of the reduction in spending 
196. See PARIS, supra note 195, at 7-9. 
197. See HURST ET AL., supra note 194, at 47; MICHAEL A. REBELL, COURTS 
AND KIDS: PURSUING EDUCATIONAL EQUITY THROUGH THE STATE COURTS 30-31 
(2009) (''Virtually all of these studies have concluded that the litigations have 
resulted in a narrowing of interdistrict expenditure disparities and an increase 
in educational spending."); KIM REUBEN & SHEILA MURRAY, RACIAL DISPARITIES 
IN EDUCATION FINANCE: GOING BEYOND EQUAL REVENUES 4-5 (2008), available at 
http://www. taxpolicycenter .org/UploadedPD F/411785_equal_revenues. pdf; 
David Card & A. Abigail Payne, School Finance Reform, the Distribution of 
School Spending, and the Distribution of Student Test Scores, 83 J. PUB. EcoN. 
49, 67 (2002). 
198. See REUBEN & MURRAY, supra note 197, at 4. 
199. REBELL, supra note 197, at 31. But see Berry, supra note 185, at 214 ("In 
contrast to much of the rhetoric about the revolutionary impact of school 
finance judgments, I find that they have had relatively small or no effects on 
most school finance outcomes. On a variety of fiscal measures, ranging from 
total spending to spending inequality, I find substantively small or statistically 
insignificant effects of school finance judgments. The most important effect, 
according to this analysis, has been to accelerate the centralization of school 
funding to the state level."). 
200. Sheila E. Murray et al., Education-Finance Reform and the Distribution 
of Education Resources, 88 AM. EcoN. REV. 789, 806 (1998). 
201. Berry, supra note 185, at 233. 
202. Id. at 223. 
203. See Verstegen & Jordan, supra note 194; Martin R. West & Paul E. 
Peterson, The Adequacy Lawsuit: A Critical Appraisal, in SCHOOL MONEY 
TRIALS: THE LEGAL PURSUIT OF EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY, supra note 185, at 1, 9-
10. 
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disparities remains unclear, some school finance systems 
undoubtedly have become more equitable than they were when 
Rodriguez was decided. 
Nevertheless, scholars also have noted that these reforms 
should not be overstated.204 The legislative response to school 
finance litigation in most states has been described as "fairly tepid," 
and minority school districts were less likely to prevail and faced 
extremely hostile legislatures when they did prev·ail.205 Despite 
several decades of school finance reform, many school finance 
systems have remained quite resistant to lasting and comprehensive 
reform.2os One persistent source of disparities in financing 
education remains the property tax,207 an approach that the Court 
in Rodriguez suggested may have been used for too long.2os A recent 
analysis of the current reliance on property taxes reveals that forty 
states use a foundation program, and five use a combination 
approach that typically includes a foundation component.209 The 
foundation approach combines a contribution from local 
governments that is typically raised through property taxes as well 
as state funding that seeks to make up the difference between the 
revenue raised by wealthy and poorer localities.21o However, this 
approach permits inequalities in funding to remain because 
"[u]sually localities can 'go beyond' the state guaranteed amount 
with additional property taxes that are unmatched by the state."211 
Research indicates that between the 1998-99 school year and the 
2008-09 school year, local property taxes consistently accounted for 
approximately thirty-five percent of funding for schools.212 
A 2013 report from President Obama's Commission on Equity 
and Excellence ("the Commission") provides some of the most recent 
research on the nature and extent of inequitable school finance 
204. See BENJAMIN MICHAEL SUPERFINE, THE CoURTS AND STANDARDS-BASED 
EDUCATION REFORM 123 (2008). 
205. RYAN, supra note 7, at 171-72. 
206. See DOUGLAS S. REED, ON EQUAL TERMS: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS 
OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 16 (2001) ("[T]hese reductions in the level of 
inequality have not substantially altered the institutional contexts of 
educational finance."); RYAN, supra note 7, at 153. 
207. See RYAN, supra note 7, at 153 ("[S]chool funding systems in just about 
every state continue to be unequal and strongly influenced by differing levels of 
property wealth."). 
208. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 58 (1973). 
209. Verstegen & Jordan, supra note 194, at 215 & tbl.l. 
210. Id. at 215. 
211. Id. 
212. SUSAN AUD ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, THE CONDITION OF 
EDUCATION 2012, at 192 tbl.A-19-1 (2012), available at http://nces.ed.gov 
/programs/coe/pdffcoe_sft.pdf. This research also reveals that states vary in 
their reliance on property taxes from lows of zero percent or close to zero 
percent in Hawaii and Vermont to highs of fifty-five percent in New Hampshire 
and Connecticut. Id. at 54. 
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disparities within the United States that remain even after 
numerous state efforts to reform school finance systems. President 
Obama created the Commission to study disparities in educational 
opportunity and emphasized the need to focus on school finance 
systems and to recommend how the federal government could assist 
in remedying these disparities.213 The Commission brought together 
many of the nation's leading experts on education finance and 
reform as well as business leaders and many of the nonprofit 
organizations that consistently work on issues of equity in 
education.214 In a February 2013 report, the Commission found that 
deeply entrenched inequities remain in the nation's school finance 
systems despite a finding by a federal commission in 1972 that the 
inequities and inadequacies in the nation's school finance systems 
were caused by outdated school finance formulas that depended too 
heavily on property taxes.215 The report acknowledged that many 
states have decreased their reliance on property taxes and have 
used the increased reliance on state funding to increase equity.216 
However, the report noted that despite four decades of reforms by 
federal, state, and local governments these reforms have failed to 
create equitable and adequate school finance systems.217 Indeed, 
the Commission summarized its finding that these reforms have 
fallen short by stating that: 
These initiatives have not addressed the fundamental sources 
of inequities and so have not generated the educational gains 
desired. Despite these efforts and proclamations, large 
achievement gaps remain, and local finance and governance 
systems continue to allow for, and in many ways encourage, 
inequitable and inadequate funding systems and inefficient 
and ineffective resource utilization.218 
The report further condemned school finance systems, with only 
limited exceptions, for failing to link school finance systems to the 
cost of ensuring that all students achieve high standards.219 The 
report also confirmed that the nation's education system continues 
to confine poor and minority communities to the poorest-performing 
teachers, poorly maintained facilities, and inferior academic 
213. See U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., CHARTER OF THE EQUITY AND EXCELLENCE 
COMMISSION 1 (2011), available at http://www2.ed.gov/aboutlbdscomm/list/eec 
/documents.html. 
214. U.S. Secretary of Education Appoints Members of Equity and Excellence 
Commission, U.S. DEP'T Eouc. (Feb. 17, 2011), http://www.ed.gov/news/press 
-releases/us-secretary-education-appoints-members-equity-and-excellence 
·COmmlSSlOn. 
215. THE EQUITY & EXCELLENCE COMM'N, supra note 9, at 17. 
216. See id. 
217. See id. at 19. 
218. See id. (emphasis added). 
219. See id. at 17. 
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opportunities and expectations.22o In light of this unequivocal 
condemnation of the nation's school finance systems, the report 
recommended a variety of reforms by the states and the federal 
government that would restructure school finance systems to 
provide for an efficient distribution of adequate resources that are 
allocated based upon students' needs and that would enable all 
students to achieve high standards.221 
Other research also confirms that many school finance systems 
within the United States fail to provide an adequate and equitable 
distribution of education funding. For instance, a 2012 report 
entitled Is School Funding Fair? A National Report Card assessed 
the school finance systems of all fifty states against four fairness 
measures: (1) funding level-the level of state and local funding for 
school districts compared to that of other states; (2) funding 
distribution-whether a state provides additional funding or reduces 
funding to schools based on the concentration of student poverty; (3) 
effort-which compares the difference between state spending on 
education relative to the fiscal capacity of the state based on its per 
capita gross domestic product; and ( 4) coverage-the percentage of 
students in the state who attend public schools.222 The resulting 
analysis provides a multifaceted and comprehensive assessment of 
the school finance systems throughout the nation that stands in 
contrast to many studies that simply use one measure of inequality. 
Several key findings highlight existing inequities in school 
finance systems. The report notes that states have the most control 
over two factors-funding distribution and effort.223 In particular, 
funding distribution provides the greatest insight into whether 
states attempt to address the additional educational needs of low-
income students.224 On this measure, "[o]nly 17 states have 
progressive funding systems, providing greater funding to high-
poverty districts than to low-poverty districts," which represents an 
increase from the fourteen states that were progressive in the 2010 
report.225 Sixteen states have regressive systems that give less 
money to high-poverty districts, and fifteen states provide the same 
220. See id. at 14. 
221. See id. at 17-20. 
222. BAKER ET AL., supra note 178, at 6-7. The authors are scholars of school 
finance, and David Sciarra, one of the nation's leading school finance attorneys, 
litigated the New Jersey school finance litigation. 
223. Id. at 10. 
224. See id. at 13, 14 & tbl.3. 
225. Id. at 13. These states are California, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, 
Indiana, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New 
Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, and Wyoming. Id. 
at 15 fig.3. Hawaii is omitted from the analysis because it is a single district 
and Alaska is omitted because the state's parse population and geography 
created inconsistent measures of funding distribution under the model used in 
the study. See id. at 13. 
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level of funding to high- and low-poverty districts.226 This reveals 
that only slightly more than one-third of the school finance systems 
are sending additional revenue to address the well-documented 
greater needs of low-income students.227 The report also notes that 
between 2007 and 2009, thirty-four states increased their effort, but 
that states varied widely in the effort made to fairly fund schools.22s 
The report further highlights the importance of both sufficient and 
progressive funding systems as an indispensable foundation for 
raising student achievement and closing the achievement gaps.229 
Ultimately, this research reveals that, although important 
reforms have undoubtedly occurred and have improved educational 
opportunities for many children, these reforms have not been 
consistently sufficient and comprehensive enough to end 
longstanding, inequitable disparities in educational opportunity 
throughout the nation. Numerous scholars have noted the 
insufficiency of these reforms.230 For instance, after surveying the 
research on the impact of school finance litigation, education law 
scholar Derek Black concluded that "[t]he most accurate general 
characterization of adequacy and equity litigation ... is that it has 
produced a net benefit, but significant and troublesome inequalities 
still persist."23l Similarly, education law and policy scholar 
Benjamin Michael Superfine has characterized the impact of school 
finance litigation as "somewhat limited" due to the longstanding 
challenges facing education litigation generally, including vague 
legal standards, empirical questions about central issues, and 
political hostility to reform.232 Further, he notes that equalization 
226. Id. at 13. The regressive states are Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, 
Illinois, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, North 
Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Virginia. Id. at 15 fig.3. 
The states that provide essentially level funding between low- and high-poverty 
districts are Arizona, Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, 
Mississippi, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont, 
Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. ld. 
227. See id. at 13. 
228. Id. at 23. 
229. Id. at 28. 
230. See, e.g., William J. Glenn, School Finance Adequacy Litigation and 
Student Achievement: A Longitudinal Analysis, 34 J. Eouc. FIN. 247, 262-63 
(2009) (finding that adequacy litigation has a small positive effect on the 
achievement of students from very low socioeconomic backgrounds and that 
such reform should be included in overall comprehensive school reform); 
Christopher Roellke et al., School Finance Litigation: The Promises and 
Limitations of the Third Wave, 79 PEABODY J. Eouc. 104, 105 (2004) ("Despite 
intensified school finance litigation and legislation over the past several 
decades, school systems in the United States continue their struggle to operate 
equitably and adequately. The evidence is clear that these goals of equity and 
adequacy have been particularly elusive for schools attended primarily by low-
income and minority children."). 
231. Black, supra note 10, at 1371 (footnotes omitted). 
232. SUPERFINE, supra note 204. 
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oftentimes did not require increased educational spending and that 
test scores ultimately have not improved even when spending was 
increased.233 Indeed, the resistance of most school finance systems 
to comprehensive reform prompted leading education law scholar 
James Ryan to comment recently that even when state school 
finance litigation has succeeded, the results have been "modest" and 
"not a single suit has done much to alter the basic structure of 
school finance schemes."234 Therefore, important reforms of state 
school finance systems have occurred that have addressed some of 
the disparities in educational opportunity, but these reforms have 
not ended the funding inequities that result in substandard schools 
for many disadvantaged schoolchildren.235 
Even though the Court in Rodriguez called for reform of the 
nation's school finance systems to advance equal educational 
opportunity,236 the local control of education that was supposed to 
encourage experimentation simply has failed to foster 
comprehensive and effective state efforts that eliminate inequitable 
disparities in educational opportunity. Although some contend that 
such experimentation and reform suggests the Court in Rodriguez 
correctly left this issue to the states,237 the steadfast persistence in 
disparities in educational opportunity that harm disadvantaged 
students indicates the Court's trust in states to end these disparities 
may have been misplaced. Therefore, closing the federal courthouse 
door to school finance litigation has left disadvantaged 
schoolchildren without a means to obtain comprehensive and lasting 
reform of school finance systems that continue to tolerate significant 
and inequitable disparities in educational opportunity. Given the 
limited impact of state school finance litigation and reform, 
Rodriguez remains essential to understanding how education 
federalism has served as one of the hindrances to the nation's efforts 
to achieve equal educational opportunity. 
The next Part shows how education federalism limited the 
potential effectiveness of NCLB. 
Ill. EDUCATION FEDERALISM AND THE NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT 
OF 2001 
The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 represents the most far-
reaching federal legislative effort to advance educational equity and 
233. Id. at 123-24. 
234. RYAN, supra note 7, at 153. 
235. See id. at 153-54, 178; Black, supra note 156, at 1357, 1371. 
236. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 50-51 
{1973). 
237. See, e.g., Sutton, supra note 161. 
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excellence in the nation's history.2ss The founding legislation for 
NCLB, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965,239 
focused on providing additional resources to disadvantaged students 
to attempt to bridge the opportunity gap between these students 
and their more affluent peers.240 Subsequent reauthorizations built 
upon this focus on low-income students while also expanding federal 
assistance to particular populations of students, such as English 
language learners.241 This federal legislation eventually embraced 
the standards and accountability movement by requiring states to 
adopt the same rigorous academic standards for all students 
through the Improving America's Schools Act of 1994.242 NCLB is a 
bipartisan congressional attempt to begin to close both the 
achievement gap and the opportunity gap.243 It substantially 
expanded and restructured the federal role in elementary and 
secondary education and, in doing so, ultimately shaped a new 
education federalism.244 
However, even as NCLB was reshaping education federalism, 
education federalism handicapped NCLB's ability to effectively 
address the achievement and opportunity gaps. This Part analyzes 
how education federalism hindered two key NCLB provisions: the 
requirement that all states adopt challenging academic standards 
and the requirement that all classrooms have a highly qualified 
teacher. This analysis reveals that even the most far-reaching 
federal effort to promote equity and excellence in education could 
not escape the policymaking constraints of education federalism. 
238. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.); see MCGUINN, supra 
note 3, at 1. 
239. Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27. 
240. See MCGUINN, supra note 3, at 1, 31. 
241. See MANNA, COLLISION COURSE, supra note 3, at 5. 
242. Pub. L. No. 103-382, §§ 1111-1112, 108 Stat. 3518, 3523-32; see 
MANNA, COLLISION COURSE, supra note 3, at 6. 
243. See No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 
1425 (noting that NCLB seeks "[t]o close the achievement gap with 
accountability, flexibility, and choice, so that no child is left behind"); 20 U.S.C. 
§ 6301 (2006) (noting that NCLB seeks "to ensure that all children have a fair, 
equal, and significant opportunity to obtain a high-quality education and reach, 
at a minimum, proficiency on challenging state academic achievement 
standards and state academic assessments"); MANNA, COLLISION CoURSE, supra 
note 3, at 22-23; McGUINN, supra note 3, at 175-76. 
244. See McGUINN, supra note 3, at 1, 195. But see Lorraine M. McDonnell, 
No Child Left Behind and the Federal Role in Education: Evolution or 
Revolution?, 80 PEABODY J. Enuc. 19, 19-21 (2005) (arguing that NCLB 
represents the continuing evolution of past federal education policy rather than 
a revolution in the federal role in education). 
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A. How Education Federalism Influenced the Requirements for 
Challenging Academic Standards in NCLB 
To understand how education federalism limited NCLB's 
potential effectiveness, it is important to understand the key 
components of NCLB. NCLB requires all states to adopt 
"challenging" academic standards at a minimum in math, reading, 
and science that are applied to all students.245 Students must be 
tested on their knowledge of these standards annually in grades 
three through eight and once in grades ten through twelve in 
reading and math beginning in the 2005-06 school year.246 
Beginning in the 2007-08 school year, science testing must be 
conducted once in each of three grade spans: grades three to five, 
grades six to nine, and grades ten to twelve.247 States also must 
define cut scores that determine when students are proficient on 
state tests, and those scores must be separately reported for student 
subgroups, including separate scores for racial and ethnic minority 
students and low-income students.248 NCLB requires all schools and 
districts to publish annual report cards detailing graduation rates, 
school performance, and whether students and subgroups of 
students are making adequate yearly progress ("A YP") toward the 
goal of proficiency for all students by 2014.249 NCLB also imposes 
accountability requirements on schools and districts that receive 
funding under Title J.250 These requirements generally impose 
increasingly interventionist corrective action each year that a school 
or a subgroup within a school did not achieve proficiency on state 
tests.251 
Despite these reformist requirements, the current 
understanding of education federalism has handcuffed the most 
progressive elements of NCLB. NCLB's requirement that all 
students become proficient at "challenging'' academic standards lies 
at the heart of its effort to close the achievement gap. However, 
rather than propose rigorous common standards for all students, the 
existing structure of education federalism led Congress to allow each 
245. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(l)(A)-(C). 
246. Id. § 6311(b)(3)(A)-(C). 
24 7. I d. § 63ll(b)(3)(C)(v)(II). 
248. The subgroups for reporting NCLB scores are gender, major racial and 
ethnic minority groups, economically disadvantaged students, English language 
learners, and disabled students. See id. § 6311(b)(3)(A), (b)(3)(C)(xiii). 
249. See id. § 631l(b)(2)(F), (c)(l), (h); see also MANNA, COLLISION COURSE, 
supra note 3, at 24. If a school or a particular subgroup is not proficient, it 
could show it made AYP if it satisfied a "safe harbor" requirement of 
demonstrating substantial improvement for the school or subgroup. See id. at 
25. 
250. See 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(l)(A), (5), (7), (8). 
251. See id. 
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state to set its own academic standards.252 Indeed, as professor of 
government Paul Manna has noted, "Long-standing political 
concerns and views of American federalism, such as the tradition of 
state and local control of curriculum and teaching, kept some 
options such as federally developed standards and tests off the 
negotiating table from the start."253 Furthermore, the statute 
ensures that the Department of Education will not exert influence 
over the content of the standards by specifically stating that "a State 
shall not be required to submit such standards to the Secretary [of 
Education]."254 Allowing states to set academic standards provides 
states with an opportunity to establish rigorous academic standards 
that would prepare students for success in postsecondary education, 
employment, and their communities.255 
Unfortunately for the nation's schoolchildren, and ultimately 
the nation, the states did not embrace this opportunity. Instead, 
many states used the flexibility within NCLB as an opportunity to 
lower standards to those that were easily attainable to avoid the 
penalties and the reforms that would be required if students did not 
reach demanding standards.256 The weak standards eviscerated the 
proficiency requirement and instead made proficiency mean very 
little in many states.257 As a result, student proficiency on state 
tests did not ensure that students were well prepared for the 
workforce or college.258 
Even though education federalism limited Congress's ability to 
adopt a national standard, Congress tried to prevent states from 
adopting low standards by requiring states to test a sample of 
students on the National Assessment of Educational Progress 
("NAEP"), a standardized achievement test on reading and math for 
fourth and eighth graders.259 However, this check proved 
252. See GARY WASSERMAN, POLITICS IN ACTION: CASES FROM THE FRONTLINES 
OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 23 (Reid Hester ed., 2011). 
253. MANNA, CoLLISION COURSE, supra note 3, at 41; see also Ryan, supra 
note 162, at 53-54 (arguing that NCLB's exclusion of provisions conditioning 
federal funds on such things as national standards or a national curriculum 
demonstrates that Congress chose to limit its reach to recognize state and local 
authority over education). 
254. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(1)(A). 
255. See MANNA, COLLISION COURSE, supra note 3, at 152. 
256. See id. at 47, 153, supra note 3, at 47, 153; WASSERMAN, supra note 252; 
Paul E. Peterson & Carlos Xabel Lastra-Anad6n, State Standards Rise in 
Reading, Fall in Math, Enuc. NEXT, Fall 2010, at 13-14, available at 
http://educa tionnext.org/files/ ednext_20 1 04_12. pdf. 
257. See MANNA, COLLISION COURSE, supra note 3, at 153; Mike Johnston, 
From Regulation to Results: Shifting American Education from Inputs to 
Outcomes, 30 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 195, 197 (2011). 
258. See WASSERMAN, supra note 253. 
259. 20 U.S.C. § 631l(c)(2); Robinson, supra note 19, at 1680; Peterson & 
Lastra-Anad6n, supra note 256, at 13. 
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insufficient to the task.260 Most states have adopted significantly 
weaker standards than the NAEP standards.261 Indeed, one study 
found that "[e]very state, for both reading and math (with the 
exception of Massachusetts for math), deems more students 
'proficient' on its own assessments than NAEP does."262 The NAEP 
data also reveal that less than one-third of the students in the 
United States are proficient in reading and that a similar 
percentage of students are proficient in math.263 
Although states continue to adjust their standards and many 
have committed in the last few years to adopt common standards in 
response to federal money offered under President Obama's Race to 
the Top Initiative,264 this analysis reveals that the congressional 
genuflect to education federalism eviscerated the heart of NCLB by 
preventing Congress from establishing a meaningful floor for state 
education standards. Without any limits on the rigor of state 
standards, many states chose to adopt weak academic standards. 
The next Subpart reveals that education federalism also limited the 
effectiveness of NCLB's requirement that every classroom must 
have a highly qualified teacher in districts that receive Title I funds. 
260. Peterson & Lastra-Anad6n, supra note 256; Robinson, supra note 19, at 
1680. 
261. See Peterson & Lastra-Anad6n, supra note 256. 
262. See id. at 14. 
263. See id. at 16. 
264. See id. at 14-16. The Obama Administration's Race to the Top program 
provided federal incentives for states to adopt state-developed common 
standards as one of the criterion for obtaining Race to the Top funds. See Race 
to the Top Fund: Notice Inviting Applications for New Awards for Fiscal Year 
(FY) 2010, 74 Fed. Reg. 59,836, 59,836 (Nov. 18, 2009). Nevertheless, Alaska, 
Minnesota, Nebraska, Texas, and Virginia refused to adopt these standards 
despite the large sums of federal funds that potentially could have been 
obtained through this competitive process. In the States, COMMON CORE ST. 
STANDARDS INITIATIVE (Feb. 15, 2013, 3:25 PM), http://www.corestandards.org 
/in-the-states. In addition, the rigor of these standards and the future 
implementation of common standards remain uncertain because substantial 
criticisms of these standards have been raised, including concerns about the 
potential for adopting weak standards and a lack of detail in the standards that 
could render them ineffective at guiding curriculum. See Sean Cavanagh, 
Resurgent Debate, Familiar Themes: Common-Standards Push Bares Unsettled 
Issue, EDVC. WK., Jan. 14, 2010, at 5, 11. Also, even if the standards help to 
increase the rigor of state standards, most states did not obtain Race to the Top 
funds to assist in the development and implementation of these standards, so it 
remains unclear how committed they will remain to implementing these 
standards in a time of scarce economic resources for schools. In addition, it also 
is unclear what "adoption" of these common standards will mean for each state 
as the states are free to adopt, incorporate, or modify these standards as they 
see fit. See id. at 5. 
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B. Education Federalism and the Highly Qualified Teacher 
Requirement for NCLB 
327 
Research establishes that urban schools with high 
concentrations of low-income and minority students typically employ 
less qualified, experienced, and effective teachers.265 To address this 
disparity, NCLB sought to close this aspect of the opportunity gap 
by requiring a highly qualified teacher in every classroom for core 
academic subjects in districts that accept Title I funds.266 NCLB 
defines a highly qualified teacher as one who holds a bachelor's 
degree, possesses competence in the subject that she teaches, and, 
obtains full state certification or passes a state licensing exam and 
holds a license to teach.267 NCLB required states to ensure that 
teachers in core subjects were highly qualified by the 2005-06 school 
year.268 To show competence to teach, a new teaching applicant for 
an elementary teaching position must pass a state exam in math, 
reading, and writing.269 A new teaching applicant for a middle 
school or high school position could show competence in one of three 
ways: pass a state exam in the subjects he or she will teach; possess 
a postsecondary major or the equivalent coursework or a graduate 
degree in the teaching subject; or, obtain credentialing 
demonstrating their knowledge.270 Veteran teachers could show 
competency in the same way, but NCLB also gave veteran teachers 
the option to show competence by demonstrating that they met a 
state standard of evaluation.271 The statute does not provide a 
federal minimum for demonstrating mastery in a subject. 272 
Congressional concerns regarding education federalism limited 
the effectiveness of these provisions. To safeguard state control of 
teacher licensure standards, Congress provided broad flexibility to 
states in defining a highly qualified teacher by allowing state 
licensure or certification and successful completion of a state test in 
the relevant subject area to establish the definition of highly 
265. See RYAN, supra note 7, at 173; see also Molly S. McUsic, The Future of 
Brown v. Board of Education: Economic Integration of the Public Schools, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 1334, 1351-52 (2004); Motoko Akiba et al., Teacher Quality, 
Opportunity Gap, and National Achievement in 46 Countries, 36 Enuc. 
RESEARCHER 369, 369-70 (2007); Linda Darling-Hammond & Barnett Berry, 
Recruiting Teachers for the 21st Century: The Foundation for Educational 
Equity, 68 J. NEGRO Enuc. 254, 256 (1999). 
266. 20 U.S.C. §§ 6319(a), 631l(c)(1), (h) (2006). Core academic subjects are 
math, science, reading or language arts, English, civics and government, 
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268. ld. § 6319(a)(2). 
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270. Id. § 7801(23)(B)(ii). 
271. Id. § 7801(23)(C)(i)-(ii). 
272. Kathleen Porter-Magee, Teacher Quality, Controversy, and NCLB, 78 
CLEARING HOUSE 26, 28 (2004). 
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qualified.273 Like the flexibility for student standards, this 
flexibility enabled states to lower standards for teachers.274 In 
response to this flexibility, "many states have developed low 
standards for defining what constitutes" a highly qualified teacher, 
particularly when they encountered implementation difficulties such 
as teacher shortages and insufficient data and information to track 
teacher qualifications.275 Indeed, although some contend that most 
states adopted rigorous standards for new teacher certification,276 
other scholars allege that states have used this flexibility to ensure 
that definitions of quality impose "no additional burden on either 
existing teachers or new entrants" because the definitions simply 
replicate preexisting certification and licensing standards.277 This 
enabled states to require only minimal competence278 and to identify 
the largest number of highly qualified teachers while avoiding 
significant repercussions for identifying substantial numbers of 
teachers who do not meet the requirements for being highly 
qualified.279 This research indicates that state efforts to adopt a 
rigorous definition of a highly qualified teacher represent the 
exception rather than the rule.2so 
Undoubtedly, other federal action also undermined the 
effectiveness of the highly qualified teacher requirements.2s1 For 
instance, the federal government issued inconsistent guidance and 
273. See 20 U.S. C. §7801{23); MANNA, COLLISION COURSE, supra note 3, at 30. 
274. See MANNA, COLLISION COURSE, supra note 3, at 47. 
275. SUPERFINE, supra note 204, at 52. 
276. See, e.g., Regina R. Umpstead & Elizabeth Kirby, Reauthorization 
Revisited: Framing the Recommendations for the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act's Reauthorization in Light of No Child Left Behind's 
Implementation Challenges, 276 Enuc. L. REP. 1, 13 (2012) ("[M]ost states 
developed rigorous requirements for new teacher certification .... "). But see 
Kate Walsh, Through the Looking Glass: How NCLB's Promise Requires Facing 
Some Hard Truths About Teacher Quality, 78 CLEARING HOUSE 22, 24 (2004) 
{"The standards [for highly qualified teachers] ranged from reasonable attempts 
to meet the spirit of the law to approaches that can best be described as 
indifferent and, at times, even disdainful of what the law is trying to do.") 
277. Eric A. Hanushek & Steven G. Rivkin, The Quality and Distribution of 
Teachers Under the No Child Left Behind Act, 24 J. ECON. PERSP. 133, 135-36 
{2010); see also Barnett Berry et al., The Search for Highly Qualified Teachers, 
85 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 684, 686 (2004); Porter-Magee, supra note 272, at 29; 
Benjamin Michael Superfine, Using the Courts to Influence the Implementation 
of No Child Left Behind, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 779, 794 (2006). 
278. Michael A. Rebell & Molly A. Hunter, 'Highly Qualified' Teachers: 
Pretense or Legal Requirement?, 85 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 690, 692 {2004). 
279. Porter-Magee, supra note 272. 
280. Rebell & Hunter, supra note 278, at 693. 
281. State implementation of the highly qualified teacher requirement also 
contributed to the limited impact of this provision. For instance, states 
distributed funding for teachers quite broadly to fund recruitment and training 
for highly qualified teachers rather than channeling these funds to schools that 
had failed to meet the highly qualified teacher mandates. SUPERFINE, supra 
note 204, at 52 {2008). 
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did not effectively enforce the requirements.2s2 In addition, the 
federal government did not provide any support to states to help 
ensure an adequate pool of qualified teachers.283 However, these 
additional failures on the part of the federal government only 
highlight that the statute needed a more rigorous definition of a 
highly qualified teacher that would have curbed state tendencies to 
lower standards when difficulties arose or additional federal 
financial support was not forthcoming. 
The flexibility within and the limitations on the highly qualified 
teacher provision caused by education federalism are particularly 
important because NCLB does not otherwise attempt to address the 
substantial disparities in the opportunity to learn state 
standards.284 Instead, NCLB requires all students to be proficient 
by 2014 even though many low-income and minority students do not 
receive the educational opportunities and resources that they would 
need to reach this standard.285 Although the states undoubtedly 
enjoy the freedom to eliminate these disparities in educational 
opportunity, Subpart II.B establishes that so far the overwhelming 
majority of states typically have chosen to tolerate these disparities 
rather than eliminate them in systematic and sustained ways.286 
NCLB also reflects federalism limits because it does not 
establish a federal curriculum or a federal assessment system, and 
it does not indicate how states should determine when a school is 
failing.287 Even though Congress could have enacted such 
provisions under the Spending Clause, these provisions were 
omitted to preserve state and local authority over these aspects of 
education.2ss However, the omission of some of these requirements 
also prevented the law from moving the nation closer to challenging 
academic standards and tests for all children as well as a 
consistently demanding definition for when a school should be 
labeled "failing." 
In addition, congressional insistence that the states must define 
standards for academics and for teachers reflects a somewhat 
dualist understanding of some areas of education law and policy. 
Even as NCLB restructured and greatly expanded the role of 
education, the refusal to adopt a floor for state standards indicates 
that Congress believed that these standards must remain the sole 
282. See MANNA, COLLISION COURSE, supra note 3, at 55-57. 
283. See Linda Darling·Hammond, From "Separate but Equal" to "No Child 
Left Behind':· The Collision of New Standards and Old Inequalities, in MANY 
CHILDREN LEFT BEHIND: How THE No CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT IS DAMAGING OUR 
CHILDREN AND OUR SCHOOLS 3, 29 (Deborah Meier & George Wood eds., 2004). 
284. See REBELL & WOLFF, supra note 7. 
285. See id. 
286. See discussion supra Subpart II.B. 
287. See Ryan, supra note 162, at 54. 
288. See id. 
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province of the states. Although this decision represents an 
understandable compromise in a statute that expanded federal 
authority over education greater than any past reauthorization of 
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, it is important to 
recognize that it is this understanding of the state role in education 
as the sole determinant of standards that served as one of the 
principal weaknesses within the statute that undermined its 
effectiveness. 
This research and analysis reveals that education federalism 
hindered NCLB's goals of reducing the achievement and opportunity 
gaps.289 NCLB undoubtedly changed the federal-state balance of 
power by expanding the federal role in education. However, the 
congressional attempts to preserve aspects of the existing balance of 
federal-state authority over education ultimately undermined 
Congress's ability to adopt more effective provisions that could have 
assisted NCLB's efforts to close the achievement and opportunity 
gaps. 
CONCLUSION 
Undoubtedly, no one factor can explain the failure of decades of 
school reform efforts. A variety of additional factors have hindered 
these reforms, and the above analysis is not attempting to suggest 
otherwise. Even with this essential caveat, it is important to 
recognize the consistent ways that education federalism limited 
several reforms as scholars, educators, and policy-makers attempt to 
understand why the nation continues to provide substandard 
educational opportunity to many students. This understanding will 
provide a crucial foundation for building more effective and 
comprehensive reforms in the future. 
Furthermore, education federalism's past hindrance of efforts to 
advance equal educational opportunity raises an important 
question: does education federalism need to be restructured to allow 
for effective federal efforts to ensure equal access to an excellent 
education? This question is particularly relevant as scholars, 
politicians, and advocacy groups are proposing a variety of 
recommendations for the reauthorization of the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act.290 In a future work, I consider this timely 
289. See MANNA, COLLISION COURSE, supra note 3, at 22-23. 
290. See Elementary and Secondary Education Amendments Act of 2011, S. 
1571, 112th Cong.; Elementary and Secondary Education Reauthorization Act 
of 2011, S. 3578, !12th Cong.; THE COMM'N. ON No CHILD LEFT' BEHIND, BEYOND 
NCLB: FuLFILLING THE PROMISE TO OUR NATION'S CHILDREN 161-69 
(2007), available at http://www.aucd.org/docs/Aspen%20Commission%20on 
%20NCLB.pdf; NAT'L EDUC. Ass'N, NEA'S LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
REAUTHORIZATION OF THE ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION ACT 1-21 
(2010), available at http://www.nea.org/assets/docs/HE/NEA_Legislative 
_Specifications_on_ESEA_MAY2010.pdf; NAT'L ScH. BDs. Ass'N, 
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question. In the meantime, it is important to acknowledge the 
systematic ways that education federalism hampered past efforts to 
ensure equal educational opportunity as the nation considers 
adopting new efforts to achieve this vital national goal. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE REAUTHORIZATION OF THE ELEMENTARY AND 
SECONDARY EDUCATION ACT 1-10 (2010), available at http://www.nsba.org 
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